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Abstract 
PAUL PICCONE’S PROVIDENTIAL MOMENT: PHENOMENOLOGY, SUBJECTIVITY, 
AND 20TH-CENTURY MARXISM IN TELOS 
 
By Jacob Aaron Ulmschneider 
Bachelor of Arts, Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of History 
at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia, 2018. 
Major director: Dr. Joseph Bendersky, Professor, Department of History, Virginia 
Commonwealth University 
 
This thesis explores the intellectual history of editor, writer, and philosopher, Paul Piccone and 
Telos, an independent journal of contemporary critical theory, which he founded in 1968. Born 
in Italy, Piccone lived most of his life in the United States, earning his Ph.D. in philosophy at 
SUNY-Buffalo in 1970. Piccone served as Telos’ editor and a major contributor from 1968 to 
2004. This thesis follows the trajectory of his thought by contextualizing his writing within the 
broader world of Marxist, and eventually post-Marxist, political philosophy. Telos also 
concerned itself with modern interpretations of historical dialectics and early 20th-century 
Marxist philosophy. Piccone himself predicated much of his philosophy on Husserlian 
phenomenology, which stresses concrete experiences, and his writing therefore stands at a 
unique confluence of Husserl and Marx. Piccone ultimately became a leading exponent of anti-
Liberal philosophy and the theory of artificial negativity, which examines capitalist hegemony in 
both material and socio-historical terms.  
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Introduction 
 
 In the fall of 1968, in the second issue of Telos, Paul Piccone—then still a graduate 
student in philosophy at SUNY-Buffalo—wrote an impassioned (if theory-laden) plea for the 
revitalization of dialectical logic in the neo-Hegelian tradition, situating dialectical reasoning 
outside of the geopolitical binary of the Cold War. Despite the ostensibly leftist orientation of 
Telos, the pages of which were brimming with Marxist interpretations of current events, 
philosophy, and history, Piccone demonstrated from the beginning the degree to which Telos 
would eschew dichotomized political categorization and reject dogmatic partisanship. “But such 
a worldwide state of affairs,” Piccone wrote, regarding Warsaw Pact- NATO competition, “[is] 
an international fraud that straitjackets reality into two equally untenable ideological 
postures… ,”1 leaving the world “hopelessly stalemated between ruthless repression and 
                                                        
1 Paul Piccone, "Dialectical Logic Today," Telos no. 2 (Fall 1968): 40, Telos online archive, 
http://journal.telospress.com/content/1968/2.toc. (accessed October 2016). 
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computerized exploitation.”2 It was this intellectually stultifying framework as well as the 
political-ideological-philosophical context it produced in terms of real-world sympathies and 
organizational tendencies, that repulsed Piccone and many early Telos contributors, who 
perceived the capacity of hopeless dogmatism to preclude the possibility of what they would 
deem genuine “qualitative” change that might improve the lives of human beings rather than the 
fortunes of political entities.  
 The fundamental mission of Telos—perennial intellectual gadfly that it was, both 
substantive and universally critical—has been manifested in terms of absolute resistance to the 
intellectually dissatisfying and dangerous trends on the left and Liberalism, both as a discourse 
and an economic system associated with capitalism. Telos was founded—in the words of Paul 
Piccone, who, prior to his death was the animating force behind Telos and its intellectual shifts—
in order to provide the New Left of the late 1960s with a “rigorous theoretical perspective and a 
clear sense of direction.”3 This sense of direction, for Piccone, required a bellicose and 
occasionally combative philosophical engagement with the sacrosanct idols of leftist thought 
contemporary to the early years of Telos and arguably presaged Telos’s eventual shift (in the late 
1970s and early 1980s) to what many participants deemed a conservative or right-wing 
perspective.4 However, it would be incorrect to characterize this shift as a genuine lurch to the 
right—rather, it was the aggregation of numerous lines of argument opposed to the centrality of 
the bureaucratic and administered late-capitalist world dominated by transnational entities that 
had effectively erased externalities and social distinctiveness. Though this did concern itself with 
what might traditionally be regarded as conservative concepts, these engagements emanated 
                                                        
2 Piccone, “Dialectical Logic Today,” 39. 
3 Ben Agger and Tim Luke, A Journal of No Illusions: Telos, Paul Piccone, and the 
Americanization of Critical Theory (New York, NY: Telos Press, 2011), 68. 
4 Agger and Luke, A Journal of No Illusions, 95. 
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from a fundamental desire to undermine the deleterious social effects of capitalist development 
rather than a reactionary evaluation of the value of traditional institutions. 
 The centrality of criticism in service of advancing what Russell Berman calls a “radical 
phenomenology as the basis for a critique of modernity”5 is what principally, despite the explicit 
identification of Telos (especially in its early years) with the left, distinguishes Telos from other 
Marxist journals and the associated intellectual tendencies that predominated in the United States 
and Europe in the latter half of the 20th century.  
 In order to understand the intellectual trajectory of Telos, from its inception in the late 
1960s when its contents evinced a commitment to the revision of a deeply flawed Marxism and 
to guidance of a parochial, doctrinaire American left to its eventual engagement with heterodox 
philosophy difficult to situate on the traditional left-right axis, any investigator must begin with 
Paul Piccone himself. Piccone’s interest in left-wing philosophy (and its inherent emphasis on 
effecting material/social improvement for the lot of the working class) and the manner in which 
this led towards theoretical engagement with illiberal thinkers from across the political spectrum 
are, in many ways, functions of Piccone’s own background, both personal and theoretical.  
The marked tendency among left-wing philosophers and intellectual producers to emerge 
from a bourgeois context (that furnished them with the material circumstances necessary to 
pursue such generally un-commodifiable activities, which is particularly evident in the 
background of early critical theorists) did not characterize Piccone’s circumstances. Rather, 
Piccone was born into what might be regarded as a stereotypically proletarian background. The 
son of working-class Italians, Piccone was born in L’Aquila, Italy, in 1940 during the Second 
World War. His family immigrated to Rochester, New York in 1954, when Piccone was 14, 
                                                        
5 Ibid., 95. 
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where his father worked as a tailor— hardly the bourgeois-intellectual background typically 
associated with the production of esoteric, complex political philosophy. Understanding 
Piccone’s proletarian background is essential insofar as it fundamentally informed his evaluation 
of the working-class and the orthodox program of revolutionary Marxists in the unrevised leftist 
tradition.  
The centrality of phenomenology to Piccone’s philosophical orientation—which will 
become clear throughout this analysis of his work—extended to his own experiences within the 
working class. In Russell Jacoby’s essay, “Paul Piccone: Outside Academe,” Piccone articulates 
his attitude towards leftist “clichés” regarding the revolutionary capacity of the modern working 
class : “We knew the ‘proletariat’ all too well to harbor any illusions about its alleged 
emancipatory potential.”6 Piccone understood the pretensions of the intellectual elite as 
manifested in the unrealistic fantasies harbored by members of the intelligentsia that carefully 
constructed members of the working class as a timeless revolutionary vanguard, serving the same 
purpose in the context of late-20th century postindustrial capitalism as they did—or were 
supposed to have—served in the 19th century. Piccone, therefore, was immune to the sort of 
externality and paternalism associated with bourgeois philosophizing about the nature of the 
inevitable proletarian revolution, an immunity that would foster and perpetuate his unorthodox 
interpretations of revolutionary change and its necessity. This attitude, distinct from other 
revolutionary theoreticians, is clear even in his early work. 
Piccone is also distinguished from other critical theorists and academics concerned with 
the construction of qualitatively different, alternative methods of social organization in that 
Piccone—and Telos—labored almost entirely outside of the academic sphere, and Telos was not 
                                                        
6 Ibid., 59. 
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explicitly associated with any particular institution or revenue source. Piccone, though 
academically trained, earning a PHD in in Philosophy from the University of SUNY-Buffalo in 
1970,7 spent the significant majority of his productive life outside of the academic sphere, 
publishing Telos independently, sustaining it via a combination of, in Russel Berman’s words, 
“subscription income, the dedication of the participants, and the self-exploitation of the editor 
[Piccone]”8— all premised on the continuing, passionate engagement of those who read and 
published in Telos. The maintenance of this engagement in the pre-digital era manifested itself in 
the formation of Telos reading groups throughout the United States and Canada, which allowed 
Telos to maintain an active connection to the effervescent intellectual life of universities in the 
1960s and 70s without being bound by the discursive restrictions. Telos was able to inhabit an 
unrestricted “life-world for ideas that exist outside the ivory tower,”9 which was, for both 
Piccone and Berman, a stultifying and intellectually restrictive context. Not being subject to the 
institutional whims of increasingly politicized Universities, which Piccone would consistently 
identify with the vested interests of the bourgeoisie and those bound by the totally administered 
system, allowed them (or cultivated the perception that it allowed them) to explore concepts that 
would otherwise be subject to social opprobrium so significant it would not be pursued in an 
institutional context.  
Telos was founded 1968 when Piccone, a graduate student, “physically produced the 
magazine from his basement…preparing camera-ready pages and delivering them to the printer” 
and coercing other participants into performing the procedural drudgery associated with the 
                                                        
7 Tim Luke,“The Trek with Telos: A Rememberance of Paul Piccone,” (January 19, 1940-July 
12, 2004), Fast Capitalism no. 1.2, n.d., 
http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_2/luke.htm (accessed January 2018). 
8 Agger and Luke, A Journal of No Illusions, 96. 
9 Ibid., 96. 
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actual act of distributing Telos. In the ‘70s, after completing his PHD, Piccone continued as the 
editor of and a contributor to Telos alongside his teaching duties as a professor in the Department 
of Sociology at Washington University in St. Louis, where he worked until he was denied tenure 
in 1977,10 marking Piccone’s permanent break with academic institutions and, perhaps, partially 
explaining his perennial cynicism regarding the capacity of universities and student-led 
movements to maintain an authentic spirit of inquiry.  
Piccone was not merely the editor of Telos, serving not just as an, if not neutral, then 
intellectually curious arbiter of inclusion, but also as the driving force behind the intellectual 
trends in which Telos was immersed. The consensus that emerges among participants in early 
Telos groups, and those who worked with Piccone directly, paints a picture of a man whose 
dynamic and bombastic personality was a significant guiding factor in determining the future of 
Telos and the nature of the publications within it. Virtually no participant in the Telos project, 
writing in retrospect, is willing or able to divorce Telos and its tendencies from the individual 
persona of Piccone. If on nothing else, given the variegated and combative multitude of writers 
published in Telos, there appears to exist some consensus on the centrality of Piccone and his 
procedural idiosyncrasies to Telos. He is described, variously, as a man “who lived exclusively 
for ideas, free of professional, familial and personal vanities”11 and a “Nietzschean figure” who 
“philosophized with a hammer,”12 whose “candid style, dynamism, imagination, combativeness, 
and human qualities commanded the loyalty of his circle and shaped the journal’s tone, direction, 
and contents.”13  
                                                        
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 51. 
12 Ibid., 70. 
13 Ibid., 25. 
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The image of Piccone evoked by his closer associates is a contradictory one. Equal parts 
radical and personally conventional, Piccone would cajole, harangue, shout, and swear, engaging 
his intellectual rivals vehemently and with gusto, while simultaneously producing measured 
scholarly work, maintaining a personal affability that seemed to be centered around long, 
meandering dinners and discussions. He was an “outsider who refused to knuckle under…who 
would tell a friend as easily as a professional superior that a piece he or she had just written 
stank.”14 Contributor Russell Jacoby’s initial impression was of a man who coexisted with the 
radicalism of the 1960s—and in many senses, at least intellectually, perpetuated and furthered 
that radicalism—but who manifested a personal style that radicals of the era found almost 
shocking: “…clean shaven, with slicked-back hair, he wore a fine suit and polished, leather, [sic] 
shoes.”15 Despite Piccone’s unconventional political sympathies, he cultivated an apparently 
conservative personal style, sartorially, intellectually, and in his unrelentingly demanding 
interactions with those for whom he had intellectual respect: “Nothing one had written was ever 
good enough, no paper one edited had been done thoroughly enough….and no amount of trouble 
taken on behalf of him and his various obsessions was ever acknowledged except in a 
backhanded way.”16 
The figure of Paul Piccone, then, looms large in the consciousness of the writers and 
participants in Telos and its annual conferences; they all agree, however, despite their many 
ideological distinctions, that to write about Telos necessarily includes writing about Piccone, 
who was not merely a scholastically vivacious and active individual but also a creative 
theoretician in his own right, using the space he had carved out in Telos to advance and express 
                                                        
14 Ibid., 60. 
15 Ibid., 59. 
16 Ibid., 51. 
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new models for understanding the contradictions and socially deleterious characteristics of 
Liberal capitalism and the contemporary incarnations of left- and right-wing thought, which he 
would ultimately seek to programmatically transcend in search of his hopeful— almost 
utopian—understanding of the possibility for the imposition of transnational qualitative 
socioeconomic change. Piccone’s capacity to step outside the ideological parameters of existing 
discourses was the foundation for his most enduring contributions to the field of intellectual 
history and philosophy, most notably his theory of artificial negativity, a broad evaluation of the 
tendency of Liberal Capitalism to internalize even its most vociferous opponents, and his specific 
articulation of the phenomenon of a “new class” of entrenched bureaucrats, with which he 
identified the new left, traditional statist right, and administrative class of university faculty, 
administrators, and other individuals with a significant interest in the maintenance of the status 
quo, or at least its central elements.  
Telos moved to its permanent and contemporary home in New York in the early 1980s—
the date of the move is not furnished in any sources—and began to manifest the intellectual shift 
away from traditional left-right axes as part of a broader response to Reaganism and the 
prevailing forces of global neoliberalism. It is important to understand, however, that Telos’ 
supposed rightward shift was not a product of ideological change or some sort of partisan 
inversal—the journals engagement with controversial thinkers, particularly Carl Schmitt, was the 
result of the instrumental value Piccone perceived in their writings. As Piccone refined his 
individual philosophy, increasingly believing the traditional political dichotomy was an 
anachronism incapable of addressing the systematic alienation inherent to late-industrial 
modernity, he began to conceive of the ideal society—one which would manifest the qualitative, 
illiberal change with which Piccone was so concerned—in terms that intersected with 
13 13 
conservative, and especially Schmittean, understandings of the nature of identity and society in 
modern Liberal societies. Piccone perceived the growth of self-interested groups, those who 
engaged in what might be deemed “identity politics,” as a profound threat to organic autonomy 
orchestrated by the “New Class,” the bureaucratic clerisy responsible for the all-consuming 
artificial negativity that sustained liberal discourses.  
This perception of identity politics as a dangerous tendency appropriated by the elite to 
sustain a fractured society, in which communal autonomy was quashed in order to perpetuate 
neoliberal exploitation, is interpreted by many of the old-guard Telos contributors as, at the very 
least, profoundly problematic—in the words of Robert Antonio, a Telos contributor and associate 
of Piccone’s from 1976 onward—it was a “reduction of human rights discourses, initiatives, and 
protections to New Class drivers of domination” that led Piccone to bizarre equivalencies, once 
comparing the US civil rights movement to the Holocaust. Simultaneously, Piccone’s 
preoccupation with the exclusive genuine manifestation of authentic society as being expressed 
in what he deemed “organic communities” fueled a broad rejection of universalism, and instead 
implied “populist local autonomy should be the rule everywhere.”17 It is critical to understand 
that Piccone’s criticisms of the Liberal extension of fundamental rights (as expressed by their 
codification by the state) was, in his thinking, symptomatic of trends that deprived communities 
of their cultural distinctiveness and left them open to systematic exploitation, and did not 
emanate from racial animus or a belief in the necessity of hierarchical arrangements.   
Since its relocation to New York, Telos has occupied the same offices for several decades, 
and continued to simultaneously engage with unorthodox or “conservative” thinkers as well as 
its perennial project of translation and explication of continental, particularly Eastern European, 
                                                        
17 Ibid., 38-39.  
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philosophers who had yet to be translated into English. Indeed, prior to Telos’ (and Piccone’s) 
instrumental use of conservative philosophy, Telos had eschewed orthodox Marxism, and the 
soviet apologetics with which it was associated during the 1960s-70s among the western left, in 
favor of “an abiding, serious interest in these largely forgotten, ignored, or suppressed traditions 
of Marxist critique that been frozen over by the Cold War.”18 These two tendencies coexist in 
Telos throughout the course of its publication under Piccone—arguably reaching a crescendo, in 
terms of coexistence and proportionate importance within Telos during the 1980s—and the spirit 
of universal criticism was studiously maintained after Piccone’s untimely death from cancer in 
2004.  
Perhaps the most difficult part of any examination of Telos and its intellectual shift is 
determining the degree of broad, enduring relevance the publication of such a diverse and 
occasionally esoteric collection of translations, sociological essays, and philosophical-political 
theorizing contained within Telos. Though Telos was self-sustaining, and remains so to this day, 
in terms of pure circulation it certainly did not rise to the level of other eminent scholarly 
publications meant for mass consumption—though no figures are immediately available, Telos 
subscriptions have generally been limited, it appears, to academic institutions and a relatively 
small but zealous group of interested parties and contributors. However, reach in terms of mere 
circulation is not an ideal metric for determining the relevance of Telos, situated as it was at the 
confluence of academia and non-university geopolitical/philosophical discussions—Telos, in the 
words of Elisabeth Chaves, “…practiced theory for theory’s sake, and this placed the journal 
farther away from other publications more directly influenced by or positioned within the 
                                                        
18 Ibid., 4. 
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economic and political fields.”19 Telos, at the very least, distinguished itself from other 
ostensibly academic journals by its degree of theoretical distinctiveness and chronologically 
broad intellectually heritage, which was occupied with the continuing importance of reevaluating 
philosophers from the 19th century onwards, a stark contrast to academic journals that “reference 
and honor” a political/intellectual heritage from “the past five to or ten years, where Telos looked 
to the past fifty or hundred years.”20 In other words, Telos—like Piccone—situated itself outside 
of the mainstream, and many former participants and contributors cite its importance in terms of 
its uniqueness and its capacity to introduce scholars to otherwise ignored realms of Marxian 
critique.  
Like the work of the Frankfurt School and Die Weltbuhne Circle, the significance of 
Telos is belied by its apparently small group of contributors and lack of institutional backing. 
From 1968 onward, Telos carved out a place for itself in the world of radical politics, 
constituting an influential medium for the exchange of ideas that would otherwise have remained 
relatively unknown or unanalyzed.  My exploration of Telos intellectual history here stands on 
the shoulders of giants, who similarly recognized the importance of evaluating political 
philosophical pursuits in the broadest sense so that we may, collectively, ascertain a more 
complete understanding of the complex intersections between theory, praxis, and the concrete 
world we occupy. Mid-20th century left-wing intellectual movements, particularly those that 
were contemporary to Piccone’s early writing and emphasized a tradition of critical cultural 
analysis, have exerted a tremendous influence on western cultural conflicts, particularly in an era 
characterized by an increasingly globalized transnational workforce and concerns vis-à-vis the 
maintenance of idiosyncratic cultural characteristics in wealthy countries. The personal 
                                                        
19 Ibid., 177. 
20 Ibid. 
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ideological trajectory of significant public intellectuals has been explored and contextualized 
with regard to manifestations of “rightward” shifts similar to that of Telos in the 1980s—such as 
David Hororwitz and Christopher Hitchens, both of whom began their careers as fairly orthodox 
Socialists and have spent the twenty-first century as prominent neo-Conservative 
commentators.21  
 The goal, therefore, of this paper is not to determine whether or not Telos had a 
substantive impact on the American political discourse, or to determine the degree to which the 
unique ideas and translations published exclusively in its pages penetrated or influenced the 
mainstream; instead, it is to treat Telos as a historical entity, with an intellectual mission defined 
by both the context in which it was produced (which, of course, changed the direction of 
Piccone’s ideas) and the editorial guidance of Piccone himself. Instead, my intention is to 
evaluate and understand the trajectory of Telos as expressed via shifts in its intellectual focus, 
particularly regarding Piccone’s unique theories of the New Class and Artificial Negativity, 
which were increasingly central to his—and Telos’—work after the late 1970s. In the words of 
Russell Berman, in "The Editor, the Journal, the Project," an essay in A Journal of No Illusions, 
there is an as-yet unaddressed “interpretative challenge” in the historiography of Telos—“to 
tease out the difference between the imprint of the founder, an editorial version of authorial 
intent, and the relative autonomy or indeterminacy of the journal itself. Telos was unthinkable 
without Piccone, but Telos was not only Piccone.”22 It is my intention to address the fundamental 
questions packed into Berman’s interpretative challenge—how did Telos change over time, and 
                                                        
21 Daniel Oppenheimer, Exit Right: The People Who Left the Left and Reshaped The American 
Century, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2016).  
22 Agger and Luke, A Journal of No Illusions, 93. 
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what was the relationship between Paul Piccone’s idiosyncratic, illiberal, socio-historical 
philosophy and intellectual approach and the intellectual reorientations of the journal itself? 
 In order to accomplish this, my intention is to evaluate Telos in two distinct chronological 
periods, in order to draw out the distinctions between the early years of Telos and the period after 
the introduction of Piccone’s concepts of the New Class and Artificial Negativity. The scope of 
this project does not permit, in practical terms, a full and comprehensive survey of Telos on the 
whole or even within the chronological framework I have selected—this is due to the breadth 
and density of the content published in Telos which, in contrast to other sources, is generally 
self-contained and requires the internalization of a specific philosophical vernacular and 
referential dialect to understand and interpret its articles. My principal focus will be on pieces 
directly relevant to the broader ideological structure of Telos itself, meaning I will exclude 
foreign language articles, reviews of contemporary scholarship, and assorted pieces that, while 
substantive, do not speak directly to the orientation of the journal itself. Given the centrality of 
Piccone to Telos prior to 2004, it is my contention that Piccone’s pieces—and the prefaces, 
editorial notes, etc.—speak most directly to the philosophical-historical “mission” of the Telos 
project.  
 Therefore, my first chapter will cover Telos from its first issue, in the Spring of 1968, to 
the fall of 1973, a five-year span that is largely characterized by an intense focus on the 
revitalization of Marxist analysis via new interpretations of dialectical reasoning and revised 
Marxist thought, largely emanating from Italian and German theoreticians of the early 20th 
century. There are several critical pieces written by Piccone during this period that demonstrate 
the depth of his engagement with Marxist theory, and provide a substantive comparative baseline 
18 18 
with which to contrast Piccone’s later work, which evinces a fundamentally different approach to 
Marxism and social theory broadly.  
 My second chapter will be devoted to the writings of Paul Piccone and other anti-liberal 
pieces published in Telos from immediately prior to its move to New York until the mid-1980s, 
from 1977 to 1984.  In this chapter, I will emphasize explanations of Piccone’s concepts of the 
New Class and Artificial Negativity, contextualized within the rising tide of 
Thatcherism/Reaganism and the prevailing Washington Consensus. Piccone’s unique theoretical 
assertions will be articulated in terms of their relationship to the rising neoliberal tide (and Telos’ 
coexisting exploration of illiberal and anti-Liberal ideologies that may be regarded as right-wing), 
and I will explore the degree to which other significant published works within Telos reflect 
Piccone’s editorial direction, undertaken in the course of Telos’ break with neo-Marxist theory. 
The fundamental relevance of this material to American political philosophy is 
significant. In much the same manner as the Frankfurt school, whose work increasingly reflected 
“a growing loss of that basic confidence, which Marxists had traditionally felt, in the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat”23 as the Institute for Social Research grew in the 
interwar period and became increasingly influential, so too did Telos depart from the existing 
truisms and political assumptions of the mid-20th century and embark on a singularly unique 
intellectual journey. Indeed, the similarities between the thinkers of the Frankfurt School and 
those would contribute to Telos is difficult to miss. Both groups concerned themselves with the 
revision of insufficient past doctrines and with the disruption of mass capitalism—perhaps more 
poignantly, however, both the Telos cadre and the principal contributors to the early publications 
of the Frankfurt School were preoccupied with deconstruction of social phenomenon that did not 
                                                        
23 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Los Angeles, California: University of California 
Press, 1973), 44. 
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necessarily manifest themselves in an exclusively material way. Or, in the words of Martin Jay, 
the early critical theorists felt that “All valid experience for the social theorist.. ought not to be 
reduced to the controlled observation of the laboratory”, an assumption that shares an essential 
skepticism with Piccone and Telos’ approach to the concept of rationality in late-capitalist 
society.24  
Furthermore, the Institut of the Frankfurt School was often occupied with not just the 
nature of exploitation under capitalism—which was understood, largely, as a fundamental 
characteristic of the system—but the ways in which the system perpetuated itself and 
strategically attenuated or managed the exploitation of the working class in a manner that 
reduced the possibility of external revolutionary action. Concepts articulated by writers in the 
Frankfurt School, in their analysis of both fascism and liberalism, are parallel to those expressed 
by Telos writers, particularly with regard to economic rationalization25 and the capacity for 
bourgeois society to exert a totalizing dominance over society in general, along with general 
dissatisfaction with ostensibly socialist regimes such as the Soviet Union.26 The most significant 
divergence between the writers of the Frankfurt School and Piccone is that Telos rarely focused 
on the cultural and artistic criticisms of Adorno, but generally concerned themselves with 
philosophical and geopolitical questions.  
Similarly influential is Istvan Deak’s work, Weimar’s Left Wing Intellectuals, published 
in 1968. Like Martin Jay’s The Dialectical Imagination (1973), it was published in the same era 
that Telos came into its own and the American left began a long period of self-examination and 
ideological reorientation. In Deak’s book, like in Jay’s, the significance of left-wing intellectual 
                                                        
24 Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 82. 
25 Ibid., 153. 
26 Ibid., 256. 
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developments is clearly articulated via a clear examination of the reverberating effects of 
philosophical efforts. While the writers for Die Weltbuhne, a German communist publication 
notable for the participation of important writers like Kurt Tucholsky—were few in number, 
their influence was significant, and they exerted considerable ideological pressure on the left-
wing parties of interwar Germany. In much the same fashion as the writers of the Frankfurt 
School, the philosophers, literary critics, playwrights, and politicians that contributed to Die 
Weltbuhne were at the forefront of changing intellectual attitudes towards the essential pursuits 
of left-wing politics and the revision of longstanding tautologies upon which those politics had 
always been predicated.  
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Chapter 1: Telos: 1968-1973—Dialectical Materialism, Phenomenology, and Neo-Marxist 
Thought 
 
 The early years of Telos are characterized by an impressive variety of publication, the 
significant majority related—at least tangentially—to the application of Marxist theoretical 
paradigms to phenomenon both contemporary and historical, along with typical Telos 
translations of eminent continental philosophers who had yet to reach wide circulation among 
western, English-speaking audiences. The scope of content, despite the small scale of readership 
(manifested mostly, in the beginning, in small groups of Piccone’s associates, known as Telos 
groups, and populated by the self-deprecatingly titled “Telosers,”27 is broad and touches upon a 
surprisingly disparate range of topics. For the purposes of my analysis, however, I have chosen 
to confine myself largely to the writings of Piccone himself—in his role as editor and, in the first 
few years, a chief generator of content, Piccone unambiguously guided Telos along its 
intellectual trajectory in the late 60s and early 70s, and demonstrates the uniqueness of Piccone’s 
interpretative stances.  
Piccone’s writings—particularly in 1968—evoke the image of a philosopher with a 
predilection for what he regards as something of a mirror image of the cult of 
scientism/hyperrationalism that Piccone associated with liberalism and thus excoriated. Instead, 
Piccone situated himself at the confluence of political philosophy, with its associated 
abstractions, and historical reasoning, characterized by the rigorous and logical identification of 
causality and the attribution of historical forces or trends to a direct line of discernable 
phenomenon. This would remain a mainstay of Piccone’s thinking for the rest of his life, and, 
though he was not formally trained in historical writing, it would be impossible to understand 
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Piccone without acknowledging the degree to which a desire for historicity exerted an influence 
upon his writing. It is also critical to note that historical mindedness is fundamentally distinct 
from the scholastic historiographic rigor that typically characterizes historical work, and Piccone 
does not adhere to the evidential and interpretative standards inherent to academic historical 
writing, lending his assertions—particularly those made in the very first issue of Telos, in his 
flagship essay—problematic in their particulars. 
Before analyzing the contents of the articles I have deemed worthy for inclusion in this 
(though virtually every piece published in Telos merits scrutiny, and the first issue alone is 
sufficiently content rich to constitute a major undertaking in its own right), it is important to note 
that Piccone, beyond his aptitude for (if occasionally flawed) philosophical reasoning, is also a 
profoundly skilled rhetorician. Telos, throughout the course of its life, was notable for an 
unwillingness to countenance jargon for the sake of jargon, i.e., the obfuscation of meaning via 
the deployment of academic vernacular profoundly repulsed Piccone and other Telos 
contributors28. This aversion to unnecessary pseudo-profundity or otherwise impenetrable syntax, 
of course, is relative, and Piccone’s writing may be more accessible than other modern Marxist 
philosophers, it nevertheless manifests a complexity of syntax and reasoning consonant with the 
subjects it addresses. It distinguishes itself, however, by merit of its syntactical “tightness,” in 
that a reader rarely feels that Piccone has embellished his language to little effect. Indeed, 
Piccone’s writing is characterized by a distinct voice, which is at once trenchant, insightful, 
bombastic, and carefully procedural. It is this “voice” that, in my mind, sets Piccone apart from 
his contemporaries—he simultaneously affects scholastic substance and a rapier-sharp wit, the 
latter embodied in his tendency to end pieces or subsections with epigrammatic flourish. 
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This first chapter, therefore, will analyze the writings of Paul Piccone in Telos between 
1968 and 1973 with a particular focus on three elements—the ideological content of the articles 
(the degree to which they appear to adhere to Marxist reasoning), the specific content of the 
relevant articles, and the “Picconean element” (the manifestations of his unique literary voice 
and specific interpretations, or precursors to them, in his early writing.) Each piece of writing 
published by Piccone in Telos in these years can be analyzed through these lenses, and it would 
be difficult to divorce Piccone’s writings in this period from the historical characteristics of 
Marxist reasoning and his idiosyncratically bellicose orientation. In order to best demonstrate the 
chronological arc of Telos’ ideological orientation, I will analyze Piccone’s writings in the order 
in which they were published.  
Spring 1968—Towards a Socio-Historical Interpretation of the Scientific Revolution 
Published in 1968, in the very first edition of Telos, Piccone’s “socio-historical 
interpretation” of the intellectual influence exerted by the growth of empiricism in the Western 
world is a fascinatingly pure manifestation of Piccone’s unique reasoning and emphasis on the 
confluence of social-material factors in determining and diagnosing the illnesses of 
contemporary Liberalism. For Piccone, like most thinkers in the tradition of revised Marxism 
that predominated in the late 1960s among Telos adherents,29 the crass materialism of earlier eras 
had been (despite his rejection of the identitarian descendants of postmodern reasoning) 
attenuated by the inclusion of immaterial factors in their reasoning. His first essay appearing in 
Telos emphasizes not only the role of material factors, always paramount in Marxist-influenced 
reasoning, but also of discursive factors concerning the manner in which the great masses of 
western society, influenced by intellectual trends from the renaissance onwards, perceived and 
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understood the world in which they inhabited. “The fact,” wrote Piccone, “that our scientifically-
oriented culture is fundamentally irrational has not generated much thinking.”30 Piccone was 
disturbed by the perennial irrationality he perceived in Western intellectuality, and attempted to 
identify and diagnose the social-historical factors that had perpetuated that irrationality.  
 In Piccone’s view, contemporary philosophy and society reflected the degree to 
which modern reasoning had failed to reckon with the spectres of irrational and supernatural 
belief that continued to assert themselves in modern society, instead emphasizing a detached and 
programmatic justification of the “philosophy of science without paying the least attention to 
what continental observers call ‘the crisis of philosophy and culture.’”31 For Piccone, this crisis 
had its roots in (like many deleterious intellectual/ideological trends in the west), the broad trend 
of empiricization and positivism that began to characterize scientific, historical, and 
philosophical inquiry in the post-Renaissance European order. His perspective in this regard is 
thoroughly Husserlian,32 concerned with the “concrete man” and the Lebenswelt (life-world) he 
occupies, which had been thoroughly and decisively “occluded” by the tendency for empiricism 
to “mathematize” reality and reconstitute it according to empirical conclusions drawn by 
observation of natural law.33 In other words, through what Piccone regards as a “diabolical 
dialectical reversal”, the rise of “Galilean science” (synonymous with arithmetical and empirical 
reasoning) was rendered “the most effective reifier of precisely that Lebenswelt it was meant to 
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change”, rendering man a mere “thing among things”, a crass objectification of the concrete 
individual into a measurable phenomenon.  
For Piccone, the vitality of the life-world occupied by man, and the subjective multitude 
of experiences examined by Husserlian phenomenology, had been eradicated in favor of bland 
teleology. Piccone uses Husserlian reasoning to define phenomenology, which posits an 
essentially dialectical manner by which an individual interacts with the universe he or she 
occupies; as a “fact-world” apprehended by the individual and existing outside of them, subject 
to the possibility of change via the capacity to doubt, and, subsequently, to understand. Put 
simply, his understanding of phenomenology acknowledges the objective existence of what 
might be deemed reality but situates the individual experience within “the nature setting” and 
“presented in experience as real, taken completely ‘free from theory’, just as it is in reality 
experienced…” and therefore not inherently subject to the hyperrationalism which Piccone finds 
so troublesome.34  
Drawing upon the work of Antonio Banfi, a celebrated Italian Marxist philosopher who 
also analyzed Galilean empiricism35, and Georg Lukàcs36 (whose translations appeared in Telos 
with some regularity from the very beginning), Piccone articulates the shortcomings he perceives 
in Husserl and Banfi’s attempts to address the so-called “crisis” in western philosophy. In 
Piccone’s view, both Banfi and Husserl fail to “take into full account the historicity of the crisis, 
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i.e., its determinate socio-historical nature”37, the identification of which is Piccone’s chief goal 
in this piece. Perhaps more than any other single sentence, the preceding quotation encapsulates 
the tendencies by which Piccone’s thought would be characterized, a focus on Husserlian 
experiential phenomenology, a breathtaking fluency in the works of continental Marxism 
(coupled with thorough criticism of their underpinnings) and a deep concern with historical 
contingency. Furthermore, the influence of traditional Marxist thought exerts itself in the 
determinism by which Piccone interprets historical causality—though not exclusively material, 
emanates from existing structures understood (by way of Lukács) in relation to society and its 
structures in general. 38  
In order to demonstrate the manner in which contemporary western society has erected an 
irascible, unscalable barrier between the concrete life of man, expressed phenomenologically 
through faith and existential reckonings, and the abstracted world of philosophical ideas, 
expressed intellectually in the sciences and philosophy, Piccone posits a Cartesian dyad 
established by the Catholic church in an attempt to resuscitate its intellectual hegemony in the 
wake of the emergence of Copernican destabilization of Catholic cosmology and the political 
disintegrations of the reformation. Interestingly, he contrasts the emergence of the empirical 
Galilean system with its intellectual antecedent, Scholasticism, which he perceives as having 
“harmonized man and society to a degree unknown since that time,”39 diminished over time by 
the plenitude of urbanization and the life-patterns encouraged by the growth of an urban elite.  
 This dyadic structure resulted from the “compromise” of Galilean science with religious 
institutions, whereupon scientific inquiry “became restricted to matters of fact…leaving 
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untouched matters of religion”, eliminating the threat posed to “dogma, tradition, and myth”40 by 
the Humanistic spirit manifested in what Piccone calls the “homo universale” of the 
Rennaissance, or “the artist that was later to become the scientist” whose attempts at effecting 
“cultural synthesis” could not be tolerated by the Church alongside the threat of Protestantism, 
which he declared to be “an epiphenomenon of rising capitalism”.41 Thus the two threats that 
faced the Catholic church were conquered—the rise of less institutionalized theological rivals to 
the existing political-religious structure of Europe (themselves a result of, at least in Piccone’s 
view, the rise of commodity exchange and the abstraction of value), and the revolutionary 
implications of unattenuated Galilean thought, the coopting of which enshrined a particular type 
of rationalism in the institutional structure of the western world.42  
It is important to note, however, that Piccone’s attribution of the institutionalization of 
irrationality, i.e., the enshrinement of religious understandings as not subject to the spirit of 
criticism seen in the artist cum scientist of the Renaissance, to Galilean science does not 
constitute a prima facie rejection of empiricism. Rather, it speaks to his perception of a genuine 
scientific revolution as having been essentially arrested in its development by the machinations 
of the Catholic Church as a response to Galilean science’s implied “rejection of the split world of 
the Scholastics”43 prior to its compromise by institutional forces. By suppressing Galileo, the 
Church “successfully put down what might have developed into a genuine scientific 
revolution”44 and provided the structural basis for the perpetuation of mythology and, more 
importantly, subdivided the “concrete man” of earlier eras into a cascading, ever-growing series 
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of subdivisions that reduced and fragmented those capable of universal criticism into mere 
technicians rather than what we might colloquially deem “Renaissance men.”45 
Piccone’s argument reaches its crescendo—and clearly articulates a Marxist world-
view—in his conclusion, which situates the failure of the concrete man (and his capacity to 
perceive the possibility of qualitative change) thoroughly within the class structure and the self-
interest of the Italian bourgeoisie. Having initially perceived the revolutionary value of Galilean 
inquiry—in terms of their own class interest, i.e., the supplanting of the feudal order with a 
modern bourgeois social structure—the Italian merchant class provided patronage for the 
sustenance of the University of Padua, from which a number of critical intellectual gadflies (e.g., 
Copernicus and Galileo) emerged. It was only once they began to threaten the “more 
sophisticated irrationalities of the bourgeois establishment” that they were suppressed and 
reduced, permanently, to a class of technicians rather than concrete men.46 It is to this reduction 
that Piccone attributes the “malaise of this century, its nihilism and loss of meaning” which can 
be only be understood via a Husserlian-Marxist analysis which pulls out the degree to which 
“[the crisis] can thus be seen as another appendage of the ideological superstructure” of 
capitalism and bourgeois rationalism. 47 
In many senses, Piccone’s first piece in Telos would telegraph, with some exceptions, the 
thought patterns by which his work would be characterized throughout the course of Telos’ early 
years. Indeed, perhaps the only element missing from Piccone’s analysis of the scientific 
revolution—which evinces a focus on Marxist-influenced perceptions of causality, structure-
superstructure relationships, and the centrality of epistemological discourses in understanding the 
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impact of knowledge production on society—is that of dialectical historical reasoning, which he 
would address tenaciously in the subsequent issue of Telos, and which would remain central to 
his reasoning throughout the course of the Marxist phase of Telos’ intellectual trajectory. It is 
because of the degree to which, in a sense, “Towards a Socio-Historical Understanding of the 
Scientific Revolution” represents a “pure” Picconean analysis that it merits a more thorough 
reading and evaluation than other pieces written by Piccone for Telos. Furthermore, the 
historicity of “Towards a Socio-Historical Understanding of the Scientific Revolution” is 
profoundly questionable, and evinces what might be regarded as axiomatic reasoning emanating 
from both an a priori hostility to religious structures and towards hyperrationalism, which are 
pervasive elements in Piccone’s writing—a desire to instrumentalize history, often to the 
detriment of what might be a coherent philosophical argument had its validity not been 
attenuated by poor historiographic reasoning.  
This generalized focus on examining political realities through a socio-historical lens is 
premised on a broader philosophical understanding of history as not merely a series of events 
open to interpretation within materialistic parameters. Instead, historical reasoning, in Telos’ 
early years, is generally presented by both Piccone and other authors in a pseudo-Hegelian 
fashion alloyed by contemporary notions of Geist as a material, rather than abstract, reckoning. 
“Man, and only man” wrote Karel Kosek in Telos’ Spring 1969 issue, “realizes himself in history. 
Consequently, history is not tragic, but the tragic is in history; it is not absurd, but the absurd 
arises in history.”48  Human activity is, for Kosek and Piccone alike, influenced by abstractions 
(such as cultural or religious characteristics), but not dictated by providential spirit; the reason, or 
spirit, articulated by Hegel does not exist independently but only through human action, and thus 
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a formulation where man is subject to immanent and immutable structures “fails to dialectize 
historical reason in a consequential way.”49 In such a framework, all actions (being 
predetermined) must be rational, and therefore the capacity for human irrationality to assert itself 
in the process of self-construction is not acknowledged, and history is thus misapprehended in its 
totality. “Man realizes himself, i.e., he humanizes himself, in history”, wrote Kosek, which 
demonstrates the fundamental degree to which historical events are merely the “unfolding of 
possibilities in time” resulting from the confrontation inherent in the dialectic.50 This 
rationalization (though not in the Galilean-empirical sense) underpins the notion of socio-
historical causation as manifested in Telos.  
 This is consonant with Marxist conceptions of dialectical movement precipitated by 
moments of social self-consciousness precipitated by world-historical events and individuals 
(having jettisoned the abstractions of pure Hegelianism). In the Spring of 1969, this particular 
concept was elaborated upon not just by Piccone in “Towards a Socio-Historical Understanding 
of the Scientific Revolution,” but also by other participants in Telos. Finally, and perhaps most 
critically, it manifests a singular focus on qualitative change, which would characterize Piccone 
even after his engagement with “organic” religious and community structures in Telos’ later 
years—the notion that, in order to reform society, the reformer must operate outside of the 
paradigms established by existing discourses. Indeed, “Towards a Socio-Historical Revolution”, 
and the undergirding thematic reverence for the so-called “concrete man” and his capacity to 
critically engage, even with the sacrosanct, speaks to the spirit of universal criticism so central to 
Picconean reasoning.  
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Fall 1968—Dialectical Logic Today 
 The Picconenean tendency to express the necessity of revolutionary revisions, or holistic 
restructurings, of historical interpretations and philosophical axioms is similarly manifested in a 
manner that would remain characteristic of his writing—that is, he is preoccupied principally 
with the philosophical undergirding of contemporary socialist thought and the morbid paralysis 
imposed upon it by the dominance of the Soviet state’s interpretation of Orthodox Marxism as a 
medium of illegitimate domination. Despite his Marxist orientation, Piccone is, at this point, 
some variation of unorthodox leftist, and clearly identifies with the fundamental notion of 
dialectical reasoning as critical to understanding the past and, thusly, the contemporary state of 
affairs. His analysis in “Dialectical Logic Today” equates the hegemony of the United States and 
the Soviet Union as essentially identical phenomenon differentiated only by carefully 
constructed ideological facades. He is most concerned, however, with purpose of dialectical 
logic in the maintenance of the status quo in both the Soviet Union and the West, and perceives a 
crisis in the employment of what he then perceived (dialectical logic) as central to any valid 
socio-historical understanding of contemporary geopolitics.  
 In the Soviet Union, though dialectical materialism remained state-enshrined, Piccone 
sees it as having stagnated, reduced to the “peripheral status” of an “abstract and formal 
discipline,”51 abused to reconcile the “divergent theory and practices” of a militant and 
repressive Soviet state.52 Simultaneously, in the West, the ideological hegemony of Liberalism, 
which “sees formal democracy as the final embodiment of human freedom” and therefore 
immune to revision and, thus, renders it incompatible with dialectical logic which implies the 
possibility of quantitative change. Echoing what would later coalesce into Piccone’s theory of 
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artificial negativity, he notes the capacity of the liberal state to “collapse the rational into the 
real”53, rendering the Liberal system axiomatic and all encompassing, a context in which any 
challenge to its hegemony—articulated in the form of teleology, perceived as something akin to 
natural law—can be dismissed as mere metaphysics. Thus he sees the geopolitical situation of 
the late 1960s as “an international fraud that straitjackets reality into two equally untenable 
ideological postures”54 competing for international dominance. 
 As is typical for Piccone, his treatment of dialectical logic as a formal philosophy is 
largely in terms of its relevance to contemporary geopolitics and the fundamental goals of 
Marxist struggle, that is to say, the emancipation of the proletariat from the yoke of capital and 
its predatory, extractive methods imposed upon the third world. However, he similarly applies 
this paradigm to the bureaucratic system of soviet dominance, as predatory in Eastern Europe as 
the United States and its allies are in the context of the Vietnam war55, seeing both the invasion 
of Vietnam and the suppression of the Czech revolution by the Soviet Union as methods by 
which both systems extend and reify themselves both geopolitically and ideologically. “In the 
same way that the US cannot win in Viet-nam,” wrote Piccone, “the USSR cannot win in Eastern 
Europe.”56 Reading his work some fifty years after it was written, one cannot help but note the 
prescience of his predictions and his astute assessment of the obstacles advocates for qualitative 
change face while immersed in the “ideological smog”57 created by the competition between the 
Liberal west and the bureaucratic USSR.  
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 Thus, Piccone concludes—in what will be a persistent theme of his philosophical work 
for the next seven years—any attempt to resolve or attenuate the perilous situation in which 
dialectical logic finds itself is via the reconciliation of formal dialectics and phenomenology, that 
is to say, both abstractions and reality must be accounted for, and the former cannot be elevated 
into the latter.58 Piccone proceeds through several contemporary manifestations of ostensibly 
Marxist dialectics—the “empiricist” dialectic, in which all dialectic is seen as exclusively a 
thoughtform inapplicable to reality except as a theoretical, analytical framework, “compressing 
the dynamicity of reality into the abstract unchangeability of categorical data,” the “existentialist 
dialectic,” which by removing the object and reducing the dialectic exclusively to the subject 
(that is to say society without concern for the conditions that create social structures), imprisons 
itself in its own contemporary discourse; and finally, “Diamat,” or the official Dialectic of the 
Soviet Union, which, in his view, disposes of the self-conscious subject critical to dialectical 
movement and change, creating a “mechanistic and deterministic framework for the dialectic, 
and the distortion of all the basic dialectical tenets.”59 In the absence of a self-conscious subject, 
the dialectic is eliminated, and reification and calcification become eternal—instead, writes 
Piccone, “what is needed is a dialectic which rejects outright to be restricted within the realm of 
thought alone” and creates conditions in which the subject can attain “concrete freedom…that 
transcends the abstract level of choice and obtains its concrete validation only in its practical 
implication of determinate alternatives.”60 To put it simply, Piccone believes qualitative, 
revolutionary change in either hegemonic system can be achieved only by a reciprocal 
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interaction between subject and object or society and structure that manifests itself meaningfully 
in the lived experiences of human beings.  
 Piccone proceeds to evaluate, in great detail, the notions of subject, object, and alienation 
as historical concepts, the latter of which has been distorted into a wide variety of psychological 
and philosophical reinterpretations, most notably the liberal interpretation of alienation as “a 
function of individual shortcomings,” representing the maladjustment of an individual to an 
otherwise coherent social system (liberalism),61 a form of apologetics devised to obfuscate the 
reality of alienation as a function of capitalist modes of production and distribution.62 Further, he 
echoes his previous essay on the scientific revolution, identifying the mind-body dualism (in 
which the mind cannot apprehend the body, and thus the dialectic cannot manifest itself) 
produced by the enlightenment as the precursor to “extreme conservatism and a reactionary 
attitude in scientific matters where, e.g., all future developments in logical theory are ruled out 
and even the possibility of evolution in nature is denied,” creating self-sustaining apologetics for 
the capitalist status quo, where “unreason becomes the precondition of reason.” Using the 
“invisible hand” proposed by Adam Smith as an example, Piccone rearticulates his view that the 
enlightenment enshrined axiomatic irrationalities as the basis upon which all rational economic 
assertions must be made, thereby rendering all things derived from those fundamentally 
irrational as well.63  
 It is in this context of universal irrationality—manifesting itself in tangible suffering for 
great masses of people—that Piccone sees the possibility of the revival of human freedom. 
“Once capitalism develops the material conditions of an economy of abundance,” wrote Piccone, 
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“human freedom becomes a concrete historical possibility which, however, can only be brought 
about by means of a qualitative change of society’s structure.”64 This possibility is remote, 
however, owing to the persistence of the neo-Kantian dualism, forces continual returns to 
“formal logic as the only logic” and the romantic dialectic as a mere medium of self-expression, 
reflecting the “fragmentary and meaningless character of modern existence in a capitalist or 
state-capitalist society.”65 Again, Piccone sees alienation and calcification premised on the 
perpetual subject-object disjunction as lying at the heart of misery in both the USSR and the 
industrialized West and preventing the advancement of a phenomenological dialectic concerned 
with concrete reality. In his mind, the solution “is to be found in the concrete universal,” itself 
premised on the rejection of dualism.66 For Piccone, ultimately, “To seek to avoid or bypass the 
dialectic invariably results in becoming trapped in one of its reified moments.”67 
Spring 1969—Students Protest, Class Structure, and Ideology 
 Piccone and Telos did not, however, focus exclusively upon philosophical abstractions 
(critical as they may be), and also subjected contemporaneous political phenomena to the same 
type of socio-historical analyses as they did historical trends. Writing in 1969, Piccone 
confronted the question of the growing student protest movement and the relationship of 
ostenstibly radical demands for change in the context of a historical dialectic immersed in a 
hyper-parameterized society that imposed profound limitations on the transgressive capacity of 
mass movements. Though this precedes the articulation of the totally administered society, 
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“Students’ Protest, Class Structure, and Ideology” indicates Piccone’s growing awareness of the 
totalizing nature of Liberal value systems in late-capitalism American society. It also indicates an 
early willingness to accept strident criticism of the Soviet and Chinese systems—Piccone’s 
principal assertion is that protest movements of the late 1960s were, whatever their immediate 
manifestation, borne out of a generalized (and universalized) opposition to stultifying 
bureaucracy. 
 “Whether one calls the object of their rebellion undimensionality, technistic alienation, or 
simply bureaucracy” wrote Piccone, “does not matter: the substance remains the same.” 68 The 
object of large-scale education, particularly at the college level, is a social necessity in virtually 
every system—to prepare those in developed capitalist states for the next stage of economic 
activity and those in developed or developing states to attain the intellectual capital to enter into 
the world market and participate meaningfully, irrespective of individual national systems. 
Education at this level, however, was not merely mechanistic vocational training and thus “the 
educational sword was double edged,” as “efforts to prepare large groups of young people to 
meet the new industrial requirements have resulted in counterfinalities that threaten the very 
foundation of the systems involved,” having inadvertently equipped students with the capacity to 
recognize and confront pervasive iniquities.69 Students, particularly those threatened by the draft 
and the Vietnam war, were “best positioned to comprehend the society’s irrational character” and 
were personally subject to the existential threat of physical annihilation overseas.70 
 However, beyond this essential capacity to apprehend the systematic nature of late-
capitalist contradictions, student protests are fundamentally compromised by their broad self-
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perception, which is “catalytic in nature” and thus understood as likely to enflame the proletariat, 
but not as an inherently revolutionary group. In Piccone’s view, this catalytic interpretation 
diverges from an objective reality in which the American proletariat “has long since ceased to be 
a progressive force,” at least partially due to the cooptation of traditional proletarian organizing 
institutions (such as unions) by the transnational market.71 This state of affairs, which Piccone 
regards as “likely to exist in the forseeable future” obviates both the revolutionary potential of 
the student movement—which premises its usefulness on its capacity to stimulate the 
permanently moribund American proletariat—and the proletarians themselves, who cannot 
escape integration into the system at large.72 Furthermore, Piccone argues that the global 
proletariat is increasingly defanged and irrelevant in a future marked by “automation and 
cybernation,” which has gradually diminished the productive significance of the traditional 
working class.73  
 Piccone also devotes considerable space to controversies surrounding civil rights, which 
he sees as essentially attenuating revolutionary potential by excluding black Americans from the 
proletarian category altogether, instead rendering them “subproletarian” and subjecting them to 
objectively different conditions than the integrated proletariat. For Piccone, “the negro 
problem…” was not a discrete issue but rather “an expression of the present American system’s 
intrinsic inability to cope with technological advances,” thereby creating a context in which the 
ever-diminishing industrial proletariat cannot be expanded to include black Americans. 74 
 The solution, then, is to understand the space occupied by the student movement and to 
reorient its catalytic nature—rather than assuming student protests in the west will act as a 
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catalyst to the independent assertion of interest by the working class. “The student movement, 
limited by its class-character,” wrote Piccone, “will have to seek a catalytic role as a mediating 
agency between the bureaucratized party structure and the alienated working class,”75 facilitating 
interactions between the two. In order for such an arrangement to manifest, however, the critical 
necessity is the establishment of “a new political party whose immediate goal is the disocclusion 
of the crisis of capitalism and of the crisis of man”76 and the subsequent deconstruction of the 
no-longer occluded system.  
 While imperialism is secondary in his analysis of student protest movements (it is merely 
a reflection of the increasingly monopolistic, transnational system of exchange as manifested in 
conflicts like Vietnam), Telos also republished a significant essay by Lukács in this issue 
(alongside Students’ Protest) that indicates the seriousness of Telos’ concern with the role of the 
philosopher-student. The broadly educated and humanitarian-minded student in this conception 
acts as a mediator between the administrative system and the proletariat, and as a bulwark 
against the reconstitution of negative, previous stages of capitalist development.  
 Written in 1948 and republished 20 years later in Telos, Lukács’ On the Responsibility of 
Intellectuals emphasizes the criticality of philosophical efforts in unmasking the agents of this 
potential reconstitution as manifestations of reaction, obfuscated in the United States by a 
masquerade in which “they carry out the suppression and exploitation of the masses in the name 
of humanity and culture,”77 particularly via imperialist machinations.78 Lukács asserts that the 
intelligentsia of 1948 “stands at a dividing point,” faced with the option of intellectual 
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collaboration—like, in his model, German scholars such as Heidegger, Spengler, and other 
reactionaries—or, alternatively, to become “path-breakers and champions of a progressive turn 
in world history”79 and therefore vindicate the concrete usefulness of the intellectual class. The 
publication of this particular work by Lukács alongside Piccone’s analysis of student protest 
movements indicates a sort of didactic warning to contemporary philosophers reading Telos in 
1969, particularly those in the context of a university—as potential catalytic mediators, the 
educated (despite their class interest) must comprehend the essential task of the anti-reactionary 
thinker.  
Thus, for Piccone, the student protest movements represent a sliver of hope dictated by 
the intersection of material-economic interests and the particularities of monopoly capitalism. 
This is notable insofar as Piccone offers objective examples of what he believes constitute 
productive praxis—the constitution of an intersectional movement that participates in electoral 
politics—and also demonstrates the degree to which, prior to the full development of the notion 
of a totally administered society, Piccone believed in the possibility of qualitative change 
manifested by individuals with a vested interest in the administered system. At this stage in his 
intellectual development, the possibility of working-class organization facilitated by cooperation 
with bourgeois students, unified in opposition to the bureaucratic union and party system, 
effecting significant change remains very real.  
Spring 1970: The Problem of Consciousness 
 Bridging the gap between his earlier works, which emphasize a somewhat more typically 
Marxist point of view, and his most important essay in this period “Phenomenological 
Marxism,” Piccone addresses the notion of consciousness in the context of advanced capitalism 
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and articulates the necessity for a contemporary approach, free of the 19th century and Leninist 
shackles by which Marxist understandings of consciousness (and therefore dialectics) had been 
previously bound. While he would go on to articulate precisely this model—and had been 
constructing it for some time, as elements of what would appear in “Phenomenological 
Marxism” appear both in “The Problem of Consciousness” and “Towards a Socio-Historical 
Understanding of the Scientific Revolution,” “The Problem of Consciousness” is a direct address 
to Marxist readers and represents a particularly Picconean evaluation of the historicity of Marxist 
understandings of consciousness. In doing so, Piccone articulates the basis for a significant 
portion of “Phenomenological Marxism,” i.e., the problematic elements in the contemporary 
understanding of class consciousness and the necessity of synthesizing a qualitative alternative to 
orthodoxy.  
 The basic Marxist notion of education—not in the conventional sense, but in the 
dialectical—posits an autodidactic capacity attained as a result of subjectification induced by the 
alienating process of modern labor, whereby the laborer retains enough subjectivity to embody 
their personal vitality in the object they produce, but are otherwise abstracted as mere elements 
of capital thus reduced to objects. Meanwhile, the product of their labors becomes the subjective 
agent of the bourgeois, and it is at this moment that (discussed at length in “Phenomenological 
Marxism”) the subject-object-identical can occur, creating the autodidactic moment in which true 
consciousness has the opportunity to coalesce. 80 In Piccone’s view, the Second and Third 
Communist International failed to take into account this “essential theoretical parameter” in their 
evaluation of the inevitability of the bourgeoisie/proletarian conflict, a result of the inability of 
capitalism to accede to even the most basic demands of trade unionism. Laying the foundation 
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for his argument in “Phenomenological Marxism”, Piccone describes the historical process 
whereby this autodidactic moment was waylaid by the expansion of capitalism via imperialistic 
processes. It was the failure to apprehend the capacity of this release-valve to relieve the tensions 
inherent in capitalism that led to the ideological failures of the internationals and represented a 
fundamental misapprehension of the nature of capital accumulation by theoreticians of the era.81  
 Theoreticians, such as Rosa Luxemburg in her Accumulation of Capital, failed to account 
for the capacity of capitalism to sustain a system of “broad reproduction” by predatory 
coexistence with noncapitalist spheres subject to exploitation by the capitalist world, which 
allowed the reinvestment of capital into the labor force, thereby allowing “the process of 
objectification [to be] indefinitely postponed, thus preventing the development of subject-object 
identity which alone is able to attain class consciousness.”82 Therefore, states characterized by 
advanced capitalist economies were increasingly insulated from the possibility of revolution, and 
the Internationals assumed that the model of broad reproduction was irrelevant insofar as it could 
not be reconciled with capitalism (as it entails limited redistribution), instead contenting 
themselves with Leninism and its assertions that class-consciousness can be externally imposed 
or the more traditional Marxist notion that one must simply sit on one’s laurels and allow the 
inevitable confrontation between the dyadic classes to occur, with the inevitable victory of the 
proletariat, and so on.83 However, as historical events clearly demonstrate, capitalism was 
capable of sustaining the model of broad reproduction within the context of imperialism and, 
despite Lenin’s recognition of the centrality of external exploitation to the suppression of 
domestic class-consciousness, he “failed to integrate his insights into a totalizing account…as 
                                                        
81 Ibid., 182. 
82 Ibid., 184. 
83 Ibid., 184-185. 
42 42 
such, for the reified western proletariat Marxism could only be introduced as an ideology wholly 
dissociated from their concrete life-situation.”84 It was when Marxism took on the characteristics 
of pure ideology that the fate of the so-called “inevitable” western revolutions was sealed. In 
Piccone’s view, Lenin’s fundamental failure was an inability to adapt analytical paradigms to the 
new context created by imperialism, despite the centrality of imperial expansion to Lenin’s work 
and to the Internationals in general.  
 The same mistake was made by Lukács, and others, who found themselves “dealing with 
mere categories which…were not categories of their concrete socio-historical otherness...but 
categories of a reality that was not approached in its natural givenness, but as another cluster of 
abstract categories,”85 thus reducing them to ideological abstractions and suffering the same fate 
as Leninist doctrines. This process, occurring in the late 1920s at the full bloom of imperial 
expansion, is where Piccone locates the core of the crisis in Marxism which he attempts to 
resolve in “Phenomenological Marxism”—the necessity of understanding Marxism within a 
socio-historical context, to subject Marxism to dialectical analysis rooted in concrete 
phenomenology (though he does not yet employ that term.) “Today,” wrote Piccone, “we have 
no meaningful theory of class-consciousness applicable to advanced industrial society,”86 and it 
is precisely the construction of this theory that Piccone attempts in “Phenomenological 
Marxism.” 
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Fall 1971: Phenomenological Marxism 
 One of Piccone’s most critical essays from the early period of Telos, “Phenomenological 
Marxism,” outlines Piccone’s perception that fundamental revisions must be made to 
contemporary Marxist doctrine in order that it should, to a fundamental degree, reflect the lived 
reality of its principle concerns (that is, the status of the proletariat and the “revolution” broadly) 
rather than strict adherence to the “empty shell held together by dogmatic slogans” propagated 
by Soviet-influenced “orthodox” Marxist outlets.87 The popularity, or at least synthetically 
imposed hegemony, of this particular brand of contentless Marxism (reduced to a series of 
political apologetics to explain the actions of the Soviet state) therefore forces any attempt to 
revise Orthodox Marxism in “contraposition to the Orthodoxy” in order to “expose the 
bankruptcy of orthodoxy for the nth time, but also explain it in terms of critical Marxism”88 that 
is capable of genuinely influencing social realities. Thus, a phenomenological treatment would 
fundamentally diverge from existing Marxism, and constitute itself as a revolutionary (rather 
than reformist) alternative to the existing status quo—and, in Piccone’s eyes, represents the only 
avenue by which Marxism can be saved “from the ideological grave into which it has been 
forced.”89 
 The severity of Piccone’s antipathy for the Soviet doctrine is at the forefront in this piece, 
particularly the degree to which it imposes itself upon the lives of regular Soviet citizens—
possibly a result of Telos’ engagements with dissident left wing writers, but also characteristic of 
Piccone’s tendency to reject state-imposed ideology even at this early stage—and he represents it 
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as (under Brezhnev) “computerized Stalinism,”90 the result of an axiomatically flawed premise at 
the base of Soviet government-social structures. These structures are nondialectic and therefore 
incapable of producing revolutionary progress, insofar as they are fundamentally wedded to the 
notion that the subject—the Soviet bureaucracy, implied to be a class unto itself (a hint at the 
way Piccone would later perceive bureaucratic apparatuses in general), was a separate subject 
from the object, soviet society itself. This “mechanistic doctrine” was founded on the notion that 
the object would, according to the manipulations of the subject, change and improve, while the 
subject, or Soviet bureaucratic class, would remain “essentially unchanged in its teleology and 
perseverance,” thus precluding the possibility of self-conscious, totalizing, revolutionary 
change.91  
 Critical to his understanding of this radical separation inherent in the Soviet system is the 
degree to which it creates and perpetuates what Piccone refers to as a “theological Marxism.”92 
Soviet Marxism is reduced to a pseudo-theological intellectual state by precisely the separation 
between subject/object with which he has concerned—the Soviet Communist Party created a 
discourse in which “everyone but the leader ends up as a mere executor of the sacred mandates,” 
and the execution of these mandates is defended fiercely by the Orthodox Marxists for whom the 
implementation of Marxism means simply acquiescence to Soviet bureaucratic commands. Thus, 
“all the philosophy and culture,” the Marxist language and reasoning, is deprived of its 
revolutionary spirit and deployed merely as a sophisticated tool of apologetics and are, therefore, 
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acts of “faith and mystification…in which the working-class spectators are forced to constantly 
applaud the ludicrous 19th century re-runs dished out by Pravda as the road to the future.”93  
 For Piccone, the hegemony of this nondialectical and philosophically bankrupt Marxism 
serves to conceal the problematic nature of twentieth-century Marxism—particularly Soviet 
Marxism, as sino-Communist analyses do not appear in this accounting—thus preventing 
scholars from integrating a contemporary understanding of the working class into a revolutionary 
Marxist phenomenology. For Piccone, it is clear even at this stage of his intellectual development 
that he no longer perceives the global proletariat as the immediate instrument of revolution, a 
truth so inherently contradictory to Marxist Orthodoxy that its merest suggestion precipitates 
dismissal and accusations of bourgeois influence. Therefore, for Piccone, his Phenomenological 
Marxism would be a reckoning with this heretofore unacknowledged truth, opening the way for 
broader philosophical self-consciousness within the Marxist discourse and thus rendering the 
inert Soviet Orthodoxy dynamic and dialectical.94 
 Piccone does not, however, claim to be the first or principal evangelist for the concept of 
phenomenological Marxism, but instead roots his claims in evaluations of what he refers to as 
the “south-west German school,” via the influence of Heidegger, writers like Lukács have 
created a Marxism distinct from Soviet theory, referred to by Piccone (and another principle 
contributor to Telos during this time period, Marcieu Merleu-Ponty95) referred to as “Western 
Marxism,” which has grown and elaborated upon itself since its initial emergence during the first 
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World War.96 This tradition was founded primarily, in Piccone’s view, as a contraposition to the 
mechanized Marxism (to which he has referred earlier in the essay and in other works in various 
terms, perhaps the most succinct being the “computerized Stalinism” from earlier in this essay) 
of the second international, which, politically irrelevant and stagnantly reformist, was in 
desperate need of a revitalized approach which would serve to remove international socialism 
from its 19th century parochialism. This, Piccone asserts, grew from interpretations emanating 
from Lukács’ attempts to “dialectically articulate a dynamic Marxism free of the metaphysical 
shackles of scientism and positivism,” approaching social analysis in a totalizing, Hegelian 
fashion.97 While the result of this attempt—Lukács’ History and Class-Consciousness—was 
unfortunately idealistic and non-phenomenological (Piccone describes it as a “beautiful dream 
altogether lacking any mediation,”)98 it laid the groundwork for later German scholars to mediate 
between lived reality and the abstract dialectics of Lukács’ work. In Piccone’s view, it was 
Herbert Marcuse who attempted to reconcile the abstractions of Marxist meaning broadly with 
socio-historical context, the latter of which can only be understood via dialectical historical 
materialism, leaving the abstractions atemporal and unmoored, much like the Orthodoxy Piccone 
despises so vehemently. 
 While Marcuse never successfully reconciled what Piccone recognizes as 
irreconcilable—“either phenomenology dissolves in the dialectic, in which case it ceases to be 
phenomenology, or the dialectic is frozen in the phenomenological foundation and loses its 
dynamism, thus ceasing to be dialectical”99—he laid the foundation for approaches that would 
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not attempt to forcibly synthesize the incompatibilities of dialectical materialism and 
phenomenology but utilize them separately, and, thus, productively. 
 Indeed, for Piccone, Marxism and Phenomenology are both mechanically irreconcilable 
and socio-historically inseparable, and only at a precise intersection of the two it becomes 
“possible to attain any reconciliation which produces a relevant phenomenology and a 
nondogmatic Marxism”100—this intersection occurs when one perceives Marxism, as an abstract 
set of ideas utilized to understand social structure, as emanating from the phenomenological or 
socio-historical characteristics of the structure in question; thus, though mechanically separate, 
both are fundamentally intertwined. Piccone elucidates upon this by explaining that 
phenomenology is, at its core “the tracing back of all mediations to human operations that 
constituted them”101 while simultaneously historicizing them, thus allowing phenomenological 
Marxism (or socio-historical Marxism) to engage dialectically with existing Marxist orthodox 
materialism and alter it to such a degree that the ossified consciousness of labor can reemerge 
from its particular material sedimentations and attain a level of what Piccone refers to as “true 
consciousness,” i.e., a socio-historical consciousness that “expresses the objective interests of the 
subjects possessing it.”102  
 “Something,” writes Piccone, “must have been wanting in Marxism from the very 
beginning.”103 An attempt to discern this absence, which Piccone identifies as a task critical for 
the contemporary 20th century Marxist (beyond the practical necessity of dealing with the 
“degeneration” of the Soviet Union), would allow a phenomenological elaboration outward and 
thus present an opportunity to understand Stalinism and the various catastrophes wrought by 
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Soviet Marxism. Therefore, phenomenological Marxism, which “reduces all theoretical 
constructs” to a socio-historical and material, or “living,” context paves the way for a true 
understanding both of the object subjected to analysis as well as the fundamental goals of that 
object (in this case, Marxism) as reflected by their impact on the life-world of everyday 
persons.104 Essentially, Piccone presents phenomenology as a means by which Marxism can 
attain a true theory of consciousness, the fundamental precursor to dialectical advancement—
which itself positions, as he articulated earlier, phenomenology as both the starting point and a 
necessary analytical tool in the construction of a revolutionary Marxism unbound by the 
moribund ruthlessness of Soviet ideology.  
 The distinction between the bourgeois philosophies and what Piccone would regard as 
real, or vital, or dynamic, or unorthodox Marxism is the degree to which it is divorced from the 
contemplative and plodding nature of bourgeois philosophical thought. Bourgeois philosophy is 
characterized as contemplative precisely because the degree of its inertness correlates exactly 
with the degree to which bourgeois observers do not produce, but merely consume, the products 
of other classes, and is thus regarded as “objective” (by the bourgeois, detached as they are from 
the living-world of production and dynamism), in which both subject and object can be 
understood, defined, and categorized before confronting one another, “taking on the form of 
mechanical materialism, idealism, or irrationalism at different times in its futile effort to 
reconcile…subject and object.”105 Which, as Piccone has noted, is an impossible task, for the 
subject and object dialectically reconstitute one another according to particular sociohistorical 
conditions and contexts. Only totalizing—and therefore phenomenological—analyses can 
account for the relationship between the concept (such as Marxism) and the object (such as 
                                                        
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 16. 
49 49 
society) by understanding them as not symmetrical in constitution but contingent upon socio-
historical factors.  
Therefore, contends Piccone, knowledge and concept production can be understood in the 
same fashion as commodity production and are subject to the same contextual influences and 
cannot be detached or abstracted outside of the manner in which capitalist society alienates the 
worker (or detaches him) from the object he produces, thus reducing him to a subject, and 
abstracts the object he produces, elevating it to the status of capital.106 Thus, the original goal—
in commodity production, the satisfaction of human (or at least bourgeois) needs—is obfuscated, 
and collapses inward as object becomes subject, and the concept of rationality produced by this 
mechanism becomes the totalizing force by which knowledge and commodity production are 
fueled. Thus the crisis of capitalism is produced as “rationality becomes its own criterion” and 
“atomic destruction and Nazi barbarism face no significant opposition: far from being a 
departure from bourgeois rationality, they are its logical outcome.”107 The individual, the subject 
now reduced to an object via the processes of production, contends with an ostensibly 
independent and predetermined rationality into which they fit “only as a mere object determined 
also by that very same Frankensteinian rationality.”108 This model, in which the dialectic 
collapses under the weight of a self-perpetuating and totalizing concept of rationality, can 
equally be applied to knowledge production. 
Elaborating upon his earlier work regarding the crisis of science and rationality as a result 
of the enlightenment’s socio-historical framework, Piccone asserts that contemporary scientists 
operate in precisely the same discursive context as a laborer, reduced to an object and unable to 
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perceive that which does not function within the so-called rational framework in which he or she 
has been forced to operate. Thus, unlike the universal scientists possessed by a broad guiding 
telos he describes in “Towards a Socio-Historical Understanding,” the contemporary knowledge-
maker represents a series of rational processes taking place in a fundamentally irrational context, 
irrational in that it has become myopic rather than universal and lacks the telos of broad inquiry 
that renders it meaningful. Since this scientific construct cannot attain a level of self-
consciousness necessary to reacquire universality, it understands the particular—or the restricted 
areas of expertise, fragmenting and growing increasingly as technology changes—as the only 
method by which the universal can be accessed.109 Thus, for Piccone, when the bourgeoisie 
“revealed itself as a particular class with material interests radically different from the nascent 
universal class, the universality of its science became an ideological tool of social 
manipulation.”110 Therefore, in much the same way bourgeois science in the Renaissance 
represented an alternative science to feudal mysticism, a non-bourgeois science can only be 
produced by the emergence of a class that bears the same relationship as the early bourgeois did 
to the feudal system, only to the contemporary bourgeoisie. Only then can an alternative, 
totalizing science characterized by authentic telos be produced.  
This particular system of production, asserts Piccone, is the very same by which Marxism 
has come into its current crisis—originally articulated as not a metaphysical perspective but 
rather a particular consciousness emerging at a particular socio-historical point with the goal of 
accomplishing a specific sociological/economic change—a universal goal, the constitution of a 
new class—it has collapsed into the subject-into-object process that has consumed both 
commodity and knowledge production. This process, however, also inherently produces, by dint 
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of the alienation of the workers, a context in which the objectified laborer becomes “subject-
object identical”111 and is therefore capable of realizing the nature of his own objective interests. 
The subject reduced to object—the worker, the scientist, Orthodox Marxism—is presented with 
the opportunity to attain historical consciousness through the process of alienation in which the 
objects produced by a laborer are embodiments of his subjectivity, or individual capacity to 
produce value (essentially, being alive). Therefore the worker must retain some degree of 
subjectivity—because a dead man cannot produce value—and his alienation, which results in 
acceptance of ruling class parameters of rationality into which they fit themselves, “sets the stage 
for the overcoming of alienation…as a commodity on the labor market, the worker finds himself 
as the product of bourgeois society, and as such, is reunited with his objectified subjectivity”112 
that had previously been stolen from him via the productive, alienating process.  
This is critical for Piccone, insofar as the moment of supreme alienation—rather than 
demonstrating an unequivocal acceptance and perpetuation of bourgeois ideology—actually 
constitutes the precise moment in which the worker is capable of demanding alterations to the 
status quo. Though these demands are typically reformist in nature and limited to the sphere of 
unionization and a desire for increased bargaining power and immediate improvements in the 
standard of living for the worker, it nevertheless represents a critical juncture in the eventual 
formation of a genuinely revolutionary self-consciousness; when the capitalist system cannot, or 
will not, meet fundamental demands, workers organizations alter their goals from specific 
reformism to revolutionary totality. Thus, in Piccone’s view, this inevitability regarding the 
accumulation of consciousness as articulated in Marx’s original works is also the site of the 
“something wanting” in original Marxism—where Marx anticipated the rise of a party as one 
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contingent upon the preexisting revolutionary consciousness of the workers, and therefore not in 
need of elaboration, theoreticians (particularly Lenin) began to insist upon the external 
imposition of consciousness on the working class. This, for Piccone, was the source of the 
contemporary crisis in Marxism—“a premature totalization of the capitalist mode of 
production”113 and, therefore, of any attempt to produce an authentic consciousness capable of 
revolutionizing that mode of production.  
The fundamental conceit at the heart of this supposedly inevitable revolutionary 
development, however, lies in the axiomatic assumption that the bourgeois-capitalist society 
would be unwilling and/or unable to satisfy even the most meager demands of the trade unions, 
and did not properly take into account the possibilities of systematically precluding the 
development of revolutionary consciousness via simultaneous acquiescence to the immediate 
demands of labor (basic reforms) and the outward expansion of the capitalist world, allowing the 
“full burden of exploitation” to be transferred to the nascent working classes of developing 
nations, thus privileging the proletariat in developed, acquisitive colonial nations.114 In Piccone’s 
view, what Marx failed to account for in the first volume of Capital was the possibility that the 
tremendous non-white populations of the world might also be taken into the rapidly expanding 
envelope of capitalist production, further exacerbating the divide between the so-called 
proletariat of the privileged colonial nations and those they colonized. Thus, this late-19th century 
revitalization of capitalism via imperialism deprived the workers of authentic, universal self-
consciousness that Marxism ought to be, instead becoming “at best, a separate ideology for 
manipulating workers and mediating the thawed class struggle.”115 Thus, Marxism in the early 
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20th century was deprived of its universality and—like commodity and knowledge production—
became perceived as an “ideology of the proletariat as a particular social class with particular 
interests”116 Therefore this degenerate Marxism, which took on many inadequate forms until 
Stalinism rendered it a “fixed metaphysics,”117 a political theology premised on the atemporal, 
contextless validity of Marxist precepts separate from its original structure, which, having been 
premised on the interests of the 19th century universal proletariat (the west), now privileged their 
particular interests above those of the universal proletariat and became a tool for bureaucratic 
oppression and selective reformism.118 
In much the same way that Marxism broadly, at the point of imperialist expansion, began 
to represent the particular interests of the western proletariat, so too did Soviet communism—
when it became apparent that the safety valve constituted by imperial expansion had checked the 
possibility for revolution in Western Europe, the doctrine of socialism in one country created a 
context in which Marxism, broadly utilized as an ideological tool to justify the ruthlessness of 
Stalinism in service of the creation of a classless society, became synonymous with the 
geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union.119 Put simply, through the same process that befell the 
workers of the developed west, the Soviet Union reduced itself to an abstract object, vitiated by 
precisely enough subjectivity to sustain the oppressive structure of the Soviet ruling class.  
It is at this moment, the point in time in which Marxism had become most thoroughly 
petrified and associated with the particular interests of particular, divergent groups, Piccone 
asserts that phenomenological Marxism becomes relevant and singular in terms of opening the 
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possibility of a consciousness that includes qualitative, revolutionary change. It is here that 
Piccone’s regard for Husserl and his Lebenswelt becomes particularly clear, as he perceives 
Husserl’s critiques of science as paradigmatically transposable onto critiques of Marxism—
where “Husserlian critique of science centers on the failure of this science to actually change 
reality by occluding it with categories and thus checkmating man as the historical agent to the 
level of a mere passive object operating among similar objects,” a Husserlian analysis of 
Marxism would begin by phenomenologically interpreting “the base as the Lebenswelt and the 
worker as transcendental subjectivity precisely to the extent that both notions have become 
reified within ‘orthodox’ Marxism and occlude rather than explain social dynamics.”120 
Husserlian phenomenological analysis would allow one to transcend the cycle by which 
precategorical conceptualized reality sustains itself by creating a reality that is perceived via the 
apprehension of one’s life through pre-existing concepts, rather than as an authentic or total 
experience. In other words, rather than being permanently trapped within a cycle of apprehension 
via preexisting (bourgeois) concepts, Husserlian analysis offers the opportunity to perform new 
labor in perceiving and apprehending reality via analysis of the Lebenswelt, which “does include 
the empirical and common sense world, but encompasses much much more.”121 Husserlian 
Marxism searches for the roots of the precategorical understandings through which the world is 
apprehended, repressed by the mundanity of alienated life and its day-to-day manifestations, so 
that a new phenomenology, unrestrained by existing bourgeois teleology, can be constituted. 122 
It is thus similar in approach to structural, sociological Marxism but divergent insofar as it is 
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universal rather than particular, qualitative rather than quantitative, and can concern itself with 
what ought to be rather than what could be within the constraints of the existing system.  
Ultimately, what Piccone and his forebears are positing is an alternative to orthodox 
Marxism that is fundamentally humanistic and principally concerned with the alteration of the 
Lebenswelt, unwilling to concede the non-economic spheres of human activity as irrelevant to 
the construction of a classless society. Indeed, Piccone stresses, at the crescendo of 
“Phenomenological Marxism”, that mere material alterations or rearrangements of the hierarchy 
of production are insufficient, should they fail to qualitatively improve the mundane lived-
experience of both capitalist and worker. Socialism, when perceived theologically and 
understood as an unchanging abstraction, is understood as having been established when 
collective control over the means of production has been established by the working class, 
typically measured via the mechanisms of bourgeois rationality (i.e., typical economic indicators, 
GNP, per-capita wealth, standard of living, etc). For the phenomenological Marxist, however, the 
acquisition of collective control is meaningless (and potentially counterproductive) if not 
accompanied by a totalizing change in the lived experience of the universal man, one in which 
“fragmented and robotized workers would become subjects consciously (politically) engaged in 
determining their destiny concretely”123 rather than as a mediated subject controlled by a 
nominally representative bureaucracy. The dissolution of the old proletariat is such that, writes 
Piccone, advanced (what we might now call late-stage) capitalism has created a context in which 
“no king’s horses or king’s men (or even a Leninist party) will ever succeed in putting Humpty 
Dumpty back together again.”124  This is because the vanguards, petrified by the hegemony of 
Soviet Marxism, cannot perceive class phenomenologically, in terms of not just the relationship 
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of a class to the means of production, but also accounting for Lebenswelt cultivated by that 
relationship—in other words, the bourgeois/proletarian dichotomy must be complicated by the 
emergence of groups with intersecting liberatory interests, discussed below, which do not adhere 
exclusively to the antiquated dyadic class model.125 
In a presentiment of his later work, Piccone ends “Phenomenological Marxism” by 
discussing the capacity for bourgeois society to internalize the interests of groups concerned with 
what is neologistically referred to as social justice. Though this would coalesce broadly into a 
thesis of artificial negativity, one of Piccone’s most vital contributions to revolutionary 
philosophy, at this stage he simply perceives the possibility that, contrary to their stated 
intentions, Black and Women’s Liberation movements and their demands—the disintegration of 
racism and total equality—can be integrated into the bourgeois system when their particular 
needs are met, thus depriving them of the universality and telos that is central to Piccone’s 
revolutionary model.126 He is, however, more hopeful about the possible integration of these 
groups into a revolutionary consciousness than in later writings—indeed, Piccone perceives the 
agitants for meaningful social justice in the late 1960s and early 1970s a tremendous, untapped 
sphere of vital energy that constitute a “fusion”127 of both universal and particular demands, and 
it is thus possible that, if appropriately influenced by a genuinely revolutionary ethos, could 
avoid “the shipwreck of revolutionary potentialities into integrated standardization”128 (and thus 
bourgeois capitalism) and instead be integrated into a class analysis that takes into account the 
sophistication of their particular interests in relation to the universal sickness of advanced 
capitalism.  
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“Phenomenological Marxism” is, perhaps, the most important work Piccone produced 
during this time period, insofar as it unambiguously demonstrates the degree to which his 
intellectual interests concern themselves with totalizing critiques of existing social, material, and 
intellectual structures as well as the fundamental humanism at the heart of his then-nascent 
philosophy of artificial negativity and phenomenological Marxism. Rather than being bound by 
an abstract adherence to mechanistic Marxism, as is so typical amongst revolutionary socialists, 
Piccone is principally interested in man’s capacity to improve his own life in a meaningful 
fashion, to transcend the mundanity and alienation of capitalist life that, in the context of 
advanced capitalism, cuts across now-outdated class and geopolitical models. Whether this 
improvement is strictly socialist, Marxist, anarchist, leftist, communalist, or any number of other 
particular labels laden with discursive meanings is relatively unimportant to the 
phenomenological Marxist, for whom precategorization and axiomatic reasoning occlude the 
possibility of even the perception of revolutionary change and are therefore inherently 
problematic. What he insists upon throughout this period is the primacy of the universal 
experience, taking into account the role of the unprivileged non-western proletariat without 
falling prey to the platitudes or simplifications of third-worldism or Leninist vanguardism, 
instead insisting upon the perpetual maintenance of a truly self-conscious, democratic system. 
While the preconditions for the establishment of universal revolutionary consciousness 
certainly include traditional Marxist goals—the acquisition of democratic control over the means 
of production, quantitative improvement in the lives of workers, an end to the exploitation of 
foreign markets as a safety mechanism for the perpetuation of domestic exploitation—these 
goals, when attained, are not terminal, do not inherently establish the classless society left 
unarticulated by Marx. For Piccone, unlike most Marxists, they are not valuable in-and-of 
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themselves, insofar as economic rearrangements do not necessarily imply qualitative changes in 
the Lebenswelt of the common man. Instead, the establishment of orthodox “socialism” creates 
the preconditions for both the acquisition of revolutionary universal consciousness or the 
opportunity for stagnation and oppression in a context that is merely quantitatively different, 
such as in the USSR. The revolutionary telos, the universal self-consciousness of not just the 
western proletariat, but of humanity broadly, can only emerge if the establishment of socialism 
transcends the quantitative discursive boundaries of bourgeois rationality and, rather than 
reification and thus alienation in a revised context, presents an opportunity for profound, 
qualitative change to the Lebenswelt of every human agent within the context of global 
capitalism.  
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Chapter 2: Telos in the 1970’s, 80’s, and Artificial Negativity 
 
In the late 1970’s and early 1980s, Telos began to chart a distinctly different course than 
it had throughout its first years in publication, in which its revisionist Marxist aspirations stood at 
forefront of its editorial mission. The intervening years—particularly the crises of the 1970s and 
the apparently unanimous victory of the Washington Consensus, combined with the perennial 
hatred by Telos contributors of the authoritarian bureaucracy of what might be deemed “actually 
existing socialism” in the Soviet Union and China (in the midst of liberalization)—had exerted 
significant pressure on the Telos circle and, in particular, Paul Piccone. Though Piccone 
fundamentally retained a desire to identify the possibilities for qualitative change in the world 
detached from tautological rationalities and systematized dogmatism, his disenchantment with 
Marxism (which he had previously treated as a patient in dire need of treatment) had grown to 
the point where it feels inaccurate to characterize the Piccone of this era as a Marxist. Indeed, 
Telos, radical as ever, began to transcend the left-right binaries in ways more transgressive than 
its previous criticisms of the specific characteristics of Marxist thought, embracing the concept 
of “artificial negativity” and criticism of the totalizing aspects of liberalism, choosing to confront 
those via whatever intellectual avenues were available rather than those traditionally associated 
with the statist left.  
 What distinguishes this era from the early Telos editions, however, is not just the seismic 
nature of the intellectual shift, but rather the effect of Piccone’s editorial leadership on the 
trajectory of the journal. Where previously Piccone had written, at great length, substantial 
philosophical essays published in Telos, he largely confined himself (though not entirely) to 
directing the intellectual tone and content of the publication, writing essays that were 
considerably shorter—but not less laconic—and penning the introduction to each edition of Telos. 
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Thus, in order to understand Telos and Piccone between 1973 and 1978, it is essential to 
understand the writers whom he chose to include in the journal, writers who it is difficult to 
imagine finding their way into the pages of Telos during its more stridently Marxist early years. 
It is also in this period that the current cohort of Telos contributors, many of whom are easily 
mischaracterized as “right wing” or otherwise non-Marxist, began to make their first 
contributions to the publication.129  
 Therefore, in this era, it is no longer consistent to label Telos merely a “left wing” journal, 
as it had grown into a uniquely critical institutional purveyor of radical anti-liberal thought, a 
tendency that would grow throughout the years (particularly those outside the scope of this 
project). The opposition to the all-consuming nature of Western liberalism, and the perception of 
the inevitability of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the liberalization of the Chinese state 
(with which Telos, largely concerned with the ideological and political characteristics of the 
United States and USSR, had more or less ignored anyway) became a paramount concern. The 
prescience of Piccone and the writers of this era is truly astounding, insofar as they predicted the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the certainty of market-driven, government-sustained Liberal 
economic hegemony on a worldwide scale, and set out to expose the inherently dangerous faults 
and contradictions of Liberalism and its supposed rationality. In doing so, Telos would 
eventually engage ideas typically anathema to Marxist thought—and broader left-wing truisms—
in an effort to identify a path to qualitative social change that could escape the tremendous 
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capacity of the Liberal state to internalize all organized opposition. Thus, Telos found itself in a 
truly unique position—an illiberal intellectual center organized around an opposition to the 
defining world-system and, having grown from a fundamentally “left-wing” perspective, 
retaining the essential characteristics of humanist socialism while simultaneously rejecting any 
and all systematic manifestations of left (or right) wing political ideology perceived as 
compromised by the artificial negativity of the state. In order to understand this process, one 
must first understand what is meant by artificial negativity, and the importance of this concept in 
locating Telos’ intellectual position during this time period.  
 Therefore, the format for this chapter will be slightly adjusted from the first—while still 
organized chronologically and emphasizing analysis of the writings of Paul Piccone, it is 
necessary to insert some pieces from other Telos contributors insofar as they are an important 
reflection of Piccone’s own views—expressed via editorial decisions more predominantly than in 
the preceding chapter—and because much of Piccone’s writing in this era lacks the explanatory 
depth seen in pieces like the following. In order to understand the basic elements of what 
Piccone did write for Telos in this period, it is essential to examine and acquire important 
definitions from other contributors, as well as to analyze the nature of their contributions in 
comparison to Piccone’s own writings in early Telos.  
1977: The Changing Function of Critical Theory 
 Writing in 1977 for the Journal of German Studies, Piccone advanced and articulated a 
similar hypothesis to “Tim Luke’s Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity”—
essentially, that the process of bureaucratic rationalization (and homogenization) by which the 
technocratic mid-20th century had been characterized had exerted a tremendous effect on society 
and intellectual analysis, one that excluded and dissolved the existing methods and 
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understandings articulated by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. While Piccone had 
roundly criticized Orthodox Marxism in Telos’ earliest days, he had remained (though he would 
likely deny it) fundamentally revisionist, rooting his vision for a neo-Marxist emancipatory 
enterprise in the possibility of reevaluating the contemporary manifestations of eternal, if 
contingent, Marxist historical structures. In the 1970s, however, Piccone—and those who wrote 
for Telos—despaired at the triumph of the one-dimensional society via homogenizing state-
bureaucratic processes, but also perceived the possibility for the reconstitution of externalities 
with the capacity to effect meaningful change. In “The Changing Function of Critical Theory,” 
Piccone alludes to the critical moment of subject-object identification he outlined in his most 
important essay, “Phenomenological Marxism,” and constitutes a framework which is 
subsequently expanded upon by Tim Luke, and Piccone himself. 
 For Piccone, in effect, traditional critical theorists had been unable to effectively address 
the subversion and intstrumentalization characteristic of the totalizing society, and were thus 
compelled to “escape into abstruseness and isolation to avoid homogenization,”130 a process 
amplified by what Piccone refers to as the “cretinization” of an increasingly irrelevant academic 
community, turning inwards and attempting to recycle Marxist theory when it had become 
unambiguously irrelevant—so much, indeed, that by the 1970s, in Piccone’s view, “Critical 
Theory itself constituted a prolonged obituary.”131 Rather than confronting the problematic 
nature of the irrelevancy of theory so deeply unmoored from praxis and, indeed, from 
phenomenological reality, the utter lack of concretely implementable political ideas emanating 
from critical theorists during the era of one-dimensionality morphed its “political impotence into 
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theoretical virtue” that could justify its continued existence only in terms of future vaguely 
defined future possibilities,132 thereby rendering it publically irrelevant. This irrelevancy, 
however, did not stem exclusively from the psychoanalytic bent or tendency towards micro-
analytical social criticism, but principally from an unwillingness to finally jettison the remnants 
of orthodox Marxist theory and its inherent belief in capitalist historical stages as a fundamental 
prelude to a “socialist pot of gold at the end of a capitalist rainbow.”133 This, in tandem with the 
focus of critical theorists on the vague possibility of a future rearrangement of society premised 
on fundamentally Marxist assumptions, rendered critical theory stagnant and unable to confront 
the absence of external negativity in late-capitalist, one-dimensional American society, 
particularly as transnational consciousness became the exclusive domain of corporate entities (a 
process further outlined by Luke).  
 In “Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity,” written a year later, Luke 
expands upon the characteristics and nature of the “transitional phase” between the 
entrepreneurial capitalism of the pre-rationalized corporate-bureaucratic system of post-new deal 
America—a critical phase that obliterated the possibilities upon which critical theory’s hope for 
the future rested, the emergence of the sort of organic counter-bureaucratic movements of the 
non-homogenized state. In Piccone’s view, which is more thoroughly articulated later by Luke, 
“the historicity of the transitional phase was altogether ignored” by critical theorists and, when it 
finally manifested itself in the form of a totalized state-bureaucratic administrative society in the 
1960s and 1970s, “it became impossible [for traditional critical theorists] to theoretically grasp 
the nature of the new developments.”134  
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 Ironically, this failure to grasp the rearrangement of society precipitated by the process of 
technocratic rationalization “embalmed and reified” the objectivist positivism of rationalizing 
processes within the analyses of critical theorists who had previously sought to avoid precisely 
the internalization of such tendencies, owing primarily to the thoroughness with which the 
discourse of the bureaucratic state had penetrated all social spheres, with the possible exception 
of the most irrelevant and cloistered academic analyses.135 In a perverse reflection of the 
eventual crises of over-rationalization that necessitated the production of artificial negativity by 
the bureaucratic system, the reification of objectivist Marxism by critical theorists, unable to 
recognize the totalizing nature of the rationalist system, imploded the relevancy of Marxist 
critical theory in much the same way the overrationalizing tendencies of the technocratic state 
revealed its own contradictions in the constitution of artificial negativity.  
 Essentially, for Piccone, critical theorists in the traditional sense had become irrelevant 
and unable to address the crisis of rationalization that the homogenizing processes of the mid-
20th century had precipitated in much the same way the one-dimensional administered society 
faced the threat of implosion due to over-rationalization—however, unlike the state-
administrative system, critical theorists did not have a framework parallel to the artificial 
negativity nurtured by the administrative state, and became effectively ossified. Where “the 
system is forced to reconstitute artificially the negativity it had hitherto sought to eliminate in 
order to provide automatic control mechanisms” to ensure its continued capacity to operate in 
accordance with the interests of the bureaucratic-corporate system, critical theorists was 
“imprisoned” in a framework that ruled out the possibility of internal contradictory (though 
carefully controlled) mechanisms that manifest themselves in the form of artificial negativity. 
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Thus, critical theory was, in Piccone’s view, rendered not only toothless in terms of its capacity 
to generate organic opposition to the totalizing system but, because of its paralysis, became 
“coextensive with the new logic of domination” and ended up “unwittingly supporting…those 
very forces it had opposed for almost half a century,” the forces of homogenization and 
dissolution of social otherness.136 
 Indeed, Piccone was unsurprised by the cooptation of critical theory by the totalizing 
society, attendant as it was to what he calls the “final collapse of any hope for the Marxist model 
in the 1970s”137 (critically demonstrating the degree to which Piccone had moved away from the 
neo-Marxism he evinced in the first chapter of this analysis). This collapse was comorbid and 
inseparable from the manifestation of artificial negativity, or the capacity—and necessity—of 
monopoly capital’s (or the totalizing state, or the administrative-corporate rationalizing state) 
cultivation of quantitative emancipatory projects as part of the maintenance of its existence. This 
does not, however, mark the end of critical theory as a relevant avenue for the exploration of the 
eventual manifestation of productive externalities, but demonstrates the necessity of—in a 
thoroughly Picconean sense—the resituation of critical theory in the 1970s as a socio-historical 
thoughtform that acknowledges its contextualization within the transitional phase of 
homogenization and leaving orthodox Marxist analysis where it belongs—at the nadir of 
entrepreneurial capitalism and its imperialist characteristics while “searching for a yet-to-be-
reconstituted critical perspective” capable of reckoning with the age of artificial negativity 
resulting from the prolonged process of state-administrative rationalization.138 
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 Like Luke would later note, and as Piccone had articulated in a less-thoroughly 
understood fashion during his Marxist era in the late 1960s—the process of homogenization in 
the United States must be understood as distinct insofar as it was institutionalized via the 
processes of Liberal democracy, such as New Deal administrative apparatuses and the artificial 
extension of civil rights (parameterized by the existing system). This is in contrast with the 
European process of mid-20th century rationalization which manifested itself in the form of 
authoritarian and genocidal projects designed to crush the organized Marxist opposition which 
did not exist in the United States. Thus, Piccone’s comparisons between the Holocaust and the 
civil rights movements, as absurd as they may seem on their face, fundamentally rely on the 
premise of distinct but universal processes of technocratic administrative rationalization meant to 
homogenize the nation-state in order to eliminate externalities and otherness that threaten the 
totalizing nature of the system, be it Liberal (in the United States) or illiberal, as in the various 
fascist and authoritarian projects of western Europe and the Soviet Union. For Piccone, then, 
gulags, Auschwitz, and the voting rights act all represent concerted efforts by the administrative 
state apparatus to homogenize society in such a way that renders it manageable and prevents the 
moment of subject-object identification that Piccone earlier articulated in “Phenomenological 
Marxism” as the necessary precursor to qualitative socioeconomic change. 
 The transition period—referred to generally as the period of rationalization, 
homogenization, state-administrative consolidation, and so on—also had the effect of validating 
Piccone’s theories regarding the situational necessity of orthodox Marxist thought (particularly 
that which emanated from Luxembourg and Lenin, which asserted that imperialism was the final 
stage of capitalism).139 In the age of decolonization and the sudden absence of the state-
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sanctioned release valve of colonial expropriation for the benefit of the metropole and the 
maintenance of its administered society, an “institutional shift” took place in the era of one-
dimensionality (that produces artificial negativity) manifested in not just the state-directed 
rationalization of labor, capital, and society in general but also the altered heading of capitalist 
development from the entrepreneurial expansionism articulated by Lenin and Luxembourg into 
what Piccone deems “intensive” rather than “extensive” growth.140 For critical theory to retain its 
relevance, it must resituate itself in the (contemporary to the late 1970s) period of intensification 
of capital growth under the aegis of increasingly transnational corporate entities with 
decreasingly significant ties to the dominant, totalizing state of the mid-20th century. This would 
be attendant to a recognition that “the homogenization and depersonalization associated with this 
[transitional period]….constitute the historical limit of this transitory rationalizing phase” and 
that the hegemony of the one-dimensional state also corresponded to the genesis of the new 
possibilities for external opposition to one-dimensionality, even if they present themselves in 
forms (such as transnational corporations) that do not correspond to traditional left-wing notions 
of external subjects.  
 Essentially, in Piccone’s view, the late 1970s represent—despite the gloominess 
associated with the domination of the administrative state and one-dimensionality—the 
reopening of emancipatory potential owing principally to the totality of the administrative state’s 
victory. In the absence of “all potential and even imagined internal opposition,” the bureaucratic-
administrative state allows the reopening of institutional spaces in which “spontaneity and 
negativity can thrive and thus generate the kind of much needed internal control mechanisms” 
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required to check the deleterious effects of bureaucratic re-rationalization.141 The fundamental 
issue with the generation of such spaces—besides their inherent artificiality, insofar as they are 
cultivated by the administrative state due to their necessity vis-à-vis the maintenance of the 
existing order—is that the triumph of the one-dimensional society had been so thoroughgoing as 
to wipe out the necessary intellectual contexts from which such spontaneous (and therefore 
authentic) negativity could emerge. For Piccone, then, in the age of artificial negativity, it is 
impossible to “automatically restore such historical formations as the long-since destroyed 
personality structure molded by organic community life” which had, in the era of entrepreneurial 
capitalism, produced the external negativity and perpetuated the non-identity or otherness of 
certain agglomerations of individuals. In effect, the reopening of public institutions, while 
representative of the possibility of the remanifestation of external negativity, failed to do so for 
want of the fundamental social context that renders the extemporaneous generation of opposition 
nearly impossible.  
 However, all is not hopeless for Piccone in the age of artificial negativity, because 
the void created by these institutional free spaces, which would once have been filled by a 
diffuse series of externalities in opposition to the administrative states, are instead characterized 
by “anomie and criminality,” in which the dissolved individual “take their revenge destructively 
once the very means of their destruction must be relented to prevent an intensification of the 
system’s internal imbalances.”142 In essence, a new, extemporaneous form of organic negativity 
wholly distinct from the intellectual constructs of entrepreneurial capitalism represent a possible 
relief-valve by which critical theory could reassert its relevance in the age of artificial negativity 
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by “paving the way for the kind of development and reception of critical theory that has hitherto 
been unimaginable.”143 It is in this context of possibility that Piccone sees a potential avenue for 
emancipatory reassertion of critical theory underlined by a reevaluation of the theory as 
historically contingent and—critically—capable of reaching an audience beyond academia and 
thus manifesting the sort of praxis required to effect any sort of qualitative change. Ultimately, 
Piccone writes, “an historically accurate reconstruction of critical theory’s own trajectory from 
its inception onward, becomes a precondition for any future renewal”144—a renewal, that, should 
it be effected, reopens the avenues for external opposition to the totalizing system that had 
otherwise been obliterated by the transitional period of the mid-20th century.  
Spring 1978: Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity 
The notion of “artificial” negativity is—in it’s essence—one that asserts the United States 
(and in general, the liberalized, developed west) has uniquely situated itself in a position that is 
invulnerable to qualitative or revolutionarily significant oppositional social movements, by merit 
of the capacity of a Liberal bureaucracy to coopt and internalize such movements. This was 
achieved, in the words of Tim Luke, when the United States, as part of the flurry of state-
rationalization that characterizes late “scientific” capitalism—completed the “transition to full 
monopoly capitalism”.145 This “rationalization,” accomplished via state and corporate 
interventionism in the (formerly) diverse economic processes of the United States, had the effect 
of homogenizing the work force, of fundamentally reordering the existing (if spotty) logic of 
paternal capitalism to one that was universal and nihilistic, reliant upon the state to correct or 
attenuate its fundamental iniquities. This process negated the forces that had once been internal 
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to Liberal society but external to the maintenance of its business interests, necessitating—
according to proponents of the theory—the synthesis, or at least management, of movements that 
emerge from the context of monopoly capitalism but direct their energies against its systematic 
manifestation.146 Internal challenges such as, say, the formation of a labor movement unmanaged 
by the state bureaucratic system could have the effect of opening a path to qualitative reordering, 
not in the interest in the eternally rationalizing administrative state—thus they must be integrated 
and subject to the same rationalizing parameters that govern the very phenomenon these 
movements ostensibly oppose.147 
 The process of Liberal internalization via the process of artificial negativity—as noted, 
essentially the coopting and eventually self-generation of dissidence without qualitative 
revolutionary elements—was the terminal form of what Luke (and other philosophers) had 
referred to as the one-dimensional society, or a society, which was rooted in the transition from 
diffuse entrepreneurial capitalism148 to a more intensified, state-sanctioned and directed form of 
capitalism. This new form, the antecedent or developing version of the monopoly capitalism that 
creates the conditions in which artificial negativity becomes a necessary protective reaction to 
qualitative or excessively reformist threats, emerges from the colonial expansion of capitalism 
and, more broadly, the process of state intervention in service of rationalization and “scientific 
management”149 of not just productive endeavors, but “all spheres of social interaction.”150 This 
process was intensified by the First World War in the United States specifically, but also in other 
advanced capitalist participants in the conflict, which necessitated the coordination of industry 
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with the maintenance of war-goals on a social level—a task which the United States set about in 
a fashion unique to developing monopoly capitalism and distinct from the more direct repressive 
methods associated with its entrepreneurial ancestor.  
According to Luke, the process by which the US working class was “disciplined” was, 
rather than via direct physical action, achieved via “the development of advertising and mass 
marketing strategies” in which “workers disciplined and repressed themselves” into communities 
premised on the shared consumption of universally available consumer products.151 This, 
however, encouraged the development of a homogeneous society in which confined social 
idiosyncrasies—or “cultural specificity, cultural otherness and political negativity”—which had 
been tolerated in the context of diffuse capitalism came under assault by the new homogeneity, 
ultimately disappearing and creating a society profoundly open to top-down instrumental 
rationalization by bureaucratic forces.152 Thus, where once the state was able to exert only 
limited control over social tendencies, culturally distinct groups, and diffuse means of production 
and commerce, the process by which a mass culture was constituted (criticized at the time by 
philosophers from the Frankfurt School) was an essential first step towards the cementing of 
monopoly capitalism and the eventual conditions that would create—or necessitate—artificial 
negativity.  
While the measures taken to control the economy in service of the war effort during the 
first world war were indeed an important step in this consolidation, Luke stresses the effects of 
the New Deal on the constitution of mass culture to a much more significant degree—the 
passage of regulatory acts in response to the stock-market crash and subsequent depression may 
have increased Union membership in a technical sense, but simultaneously subsumed Unions to 
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the rational-bureaucratic process driven by the state, rendering them a systematized part of 
administrative capitalism. This was effected by the “reconstitution of the individual and 
communal fragments in national unions, standardized collective bargaining, public works 
employment, and the federally managed national economy,”153 essentially creating a profound 
and permanent interdependence between the working class and the now-interconnected state-
corporate administrative bureaucracy. These tendencies continued through other rationalizing 
state sponsored projects, such as the (attempted) Fair Deal, Great Society, etc, creating a context 
in which universal rationalization —governed and manifested by “bureaucratic decisionism”—
becomes the norm.154 Once this has been accomplished, the system lacks an Outsider (or, in the 
language of Piccone’s phenomenological Marxism, a subject capable of comprehending his own 
objectification), and thus becomes unable to rationalize itself in response to an outside threat, but 
instead begins the process of re-rationalization, subverting the purpose and nature of the initial 
rationalizing process owing to the absence of an external point of reference, an Outsider or 
subject.155 These internal contradictions, borne from a lack of external contradictions to the 
rationalizing nature of the system (external insofar as they emanate from the same broad one-
dimensional society or nation-state) fundamentally necessitate the transition from one-
dimensionality to artificial negativity. 
While Luke has principally focused on the domestic characteristics of the cementing of 
one-dimensionality and the subsequent transition to artificial negativity, he also positions these 
social changes within the international sphere and geopolitical context. Where once, in the 
context of entrepreneurial capitalism, “gunboat diplomacy” was replaced by subtler, more 
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discreet techniques supplemented by the power of transnational corporate consumption, which 
was self-incentivizing and typically did not require the sort of coercive action manifested in 
direct military intervention.156 The international corporate entity serves to effectively extend US 
homogeneity—manifested in patterns of social organization and consumption and therefore 
premised largely on the availability of goods provided by corporations, not governments—as 
well as political and economic control via “unequal exchange of transnational commerce,”157 or a 
permutation of extractive imperialism that no longer requires the physically coercive elements of 
military or covert manipulation.  
Indeed, this “new imperialism,” manifested almost entirely outside of the traditional 
political-interventionist spheres of superpower politics premised on the cold war dichotomy 
allowed, in Luke’s view, the west to extend its hegemony over even Marxist-Leninist states in 
Asia and Africa—“given Cuba and Eastern Europe’s own technological dependence on Western 
Transnational enterprise,” writes Luke, the development of nominally Marxist states (in this 
example Ethiopia) “can only proceed rationally under the new imperialism….” 158 Essentially, 
the maintenance of overseas interests is no longer a militarized process, but instead one 
characterized by the almost universal penetration of western modes of production and 
consumption, which are simultaneously capable of imposing the same rationalized order as the 
“old imperialism,” but with considerably less international opprobrium and under the illusion of 
voluntary interaction.  
The inability to recognize this new order of what might be deemed, in modern parlance, 
informal imperialism, was a significant element of the collapse of the “New Left” in the 1970s—
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in Luke’s view, though the “New Left” was not subverted directly by McCarthyist tactics or 
government intervention, its existence in the context of the Vietnam War and the domestic 
turmoil of the 1960s left them in a political bind in which “it either had to overthrow entirely the 
administrative regime or strengthen it with its innovative notions.”159 The New Left, by dint of 
the context from which it emerged (Luke contrasts them with the “prairie socialism” of the old 
left and Progressivism of the turn of the 20th century), inherently sought only to reform the state 
in which they had a vested interest as members of the intelligentsia, middle-class university 
graduates, and other “elites” with a “large stake in the existing reward structure of the 
system,”160 positioned them to merely reintegrate themselves into an altered system (and regress 
into the divisive orthodoxy of Old Left political discourse) rather than advance a truly counter-
bureaucratic system—thus creating an artificial, managed negativity subsumed by, and then 
remanifested in, bureaucratized methods such as electoral politics and political lobbying.161 This 
served to strengthen the administrative state while advancing small scale reforms that remained 
within the purview of that state, whilst maintaining the illusion that participatory governmental 
reformism represented a valid avenue for the “New Left” to pursue its goals.  
However, the other, less-remarked upon and more central to Luke (and Piccone’s) 
understanding of counter-bureaucratic movements that were fundamentally advantageous to the 
extension of corporate interests were those made by transnational corporations in the wake of 
decolonization and service-economic transition, “which reopened the contradictions between 
state and corporation in advanced capitalist society”162 that had previously been mended by the 
administrative-corporate regime of the post-World War and New Deal bureaucratic efforts. 
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Where previously gunboat diplomacy and entrepreneurial capitalism had effected the 
transitioned to a one-dimensional society, the secondary transition was effected without the aid 
of state-sanctioned intervention and indeed often contravened the ostensible policies of state 
economic regulatory monopoly—transnational corporations “sketched out their own corporate 
foreign, economic, employment, and investment opportunities”163 distinct from the interests of 
the nation-states by whose interests they had previously been bound. In effect, where during the 
era of bureaucratic rationalism imposed by the state via regulatory avenues on corporations in 
service of the national interest (homogenizing as that interest may have been), as “full monopoly 
capital” was attained, corporations instrumentalized the power of the state to serve their interests, 
rather than the instrumentalization of corporate institutions in service of national interests.164 
Full monopoly capitalism, therefore, had the effect of reintroducing the element of 
externality which had hitherto been lacking in the aftermath of the triumph of bureaucratic-
regulatory one dimensionality. This externality, where in the era before the regulatory triumph of 
the new deal state and the subsequent cementation of monopoly capitalism had manifested itself 
in organic terms (unions and workers collectives which sprang extemporaneously from 
sociopolitical exigency as opposed to those sanctioned by the states), the new externality (or 
negativity) was a manifestation of the self-interest of empowered transnational corporations. In 
the context of cold-war proxy conflicts and the tremendous international opportunities produced 
by decolonization, transnational entities, or “knowledge-intensive, technology exporting 
industries”165 that represent the crescendo of monopoly capitalism utilized their externality to 
“instrumentally organize the entire world,” including what were (and often still are) regarded as 
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super-powers.166 Simultaneously, corporations that had previously conceded certain elements of 
control to the state during the facilitated transition to monopoly capitalism (and one-
dimensionality) began to reassert their economic interests in the domestic sphere of their nation-
states of origin, particularly the United States. Privatization of social security, pension systems, 
healthcare, and virtually every element of the interventionist state “illustrate[d] the opening of a 
new counter-offensive against the state-supported labor unions.”167 Thus the transnational 
corporation, which had previously operated cooperatively with the state as part of a one-
dimensional bureaucratic entity, began to assert its own interests and simultaneously encouraged 
the growth of complementary counter-bureaucratic movements, again emanating from 
manageable, procedural demands for reform operating within a negative space permitted 
(“purposely opened”) by the bureaucratic system.168 
These noncorporate counter-bureaucratic forces are, in Luke’s view, managed by the 
state and social system in such a way that they provide a relief valve for the contradictory 
elements of monopoly capital in a phenomenological sense (which is to say, the lived experience 
of the subject-worker and their relative level of alienation) by ensuring such movements—such 
as Ralph Nader’s abortive attempts at creating a broad system of consumer protection in the 
1970s—did not accumulate enough political or material capital to fundamentally “disrupt or 
dismantle” the state or corporate system.169 
This tendency, combined with neoliberal reforms to the nation state that involved the 
devolution of the provision of basic welfare to the local level and the decentralization of 
responsibility for the maintenance of those programs via systems such as block-grants and public 
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private partnerships (revenue sharing), continue the counter-bureaucratic tendency of the 
diffusion of state power. Similarly, asserts Luke, in the wake of Watergate and other scandals 
that precipitated legislative regulation of the power of the executive branch—what Luke deems a 
“post-imperial presidency”—reduce the capacity of the executive to act against the interests of 
the artificially created negativity driven and maintained by corporate interests.170 
Similarly, though perhaps less importantly (in terms of capacity to drive significant 
change), informal expressions of artificial negativity abound in particular revisions to the actual 
administrative capacities of the formerly one-dimensional bureaucratic state. What Luke refers to 
as “bureaucratic insurgency tactics”—essentially those which increase accountability and 
transparency within the increasingly diffused and devolved bureaucratic system, such as 
(particularly relevant to the contemporary reader) information leaks and transparency—have the 
effect of systematically accommodating artificial negativity in the form of democratically 
parameterized public participation in regulatory administration.171 This has the overall effect of 
creating anti-bureaucratic systems that fulfill the essential roles of the previously homogenizing 
system, while simultaneously expressing an opposition to that system that stops short of 
demanding qualitative or fundamental change in its phenomenological reality.  
Finally, Luke sees advances in communications technology as reopening spaces for 
cultural expression that had been previously reduced or eliminated by the homogenizing process 
of the bureaucratic transition effected by the achievement of civil rights, state-sanctioned unions, 
and other systems by which previously diffuse identities had been subsumed by the state-
corporate compact. These, in tandem with the “alternative cultural movements” of the 1960s and 
70s (student protests, black power, feminist movements, anti-war groups, etc) “sought to revive 
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artificially the personal specificity and group-based otherness that the standardizing dictates [of 
the transitional period’s homogenizing implements]…had suppressed for four decades.”172 Thus, 
the age of artificial negativity is, in a sense, the resurrection of the particularity that had preceded 
the cementation of monopolistic capital and one-dimensionality—within the manageable 
parameters of the state-corporate system, however deregulated or diffused it may have become. 
The connection between all of these subversions of the homogenizing system—the rollback of 
the welfare state, the localization and atomization of administrative apparatuses, the reassertion 
of cultural identities and particularities and the assertion of transnational corporate interests 
abroad—is the thread of artificial negativity, “which emanates from within monopoly capital but 
is directed against the state-corporate regime.”173 Artificial negativity is ultimately a system 
whereby the maintenance of monopoly capital—albeit in a format that transcends the transitional 
period of state-corporate homogenization—is sustained and expressed in performative, particular 
social and political movements that alter the expressions of life under monopoly capitalism but 
are inherently unable to challenge the material-discursive hegemony of monopoly capital itself.  
For Luke, this historical outline represents a process whereby hyper-rationalization on all 
levels leads inevitably to recursive re-rationalization and the breakdown of the managed, rational 
system, a “slippage in the instrumental command over capital expansion,” disrupting the capacity 
of the system to provide the material necessities that maintain the artificiality of negativity within 
the Liberal system. “The most distinctive characteristic,” writes Luke, “of artificial negativity is 
that it is counter-productive and can never become a substitute for the organic negativity that is 
no longer spontaneously generated.”174 It therefore follows, for Luke, that the necessity of 
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organic negativity will become apparent when the material effects of the crisis of re-
rationalization force the subjects of monopoly capitalism to confront the contradictions by which 
the economic-political regime is increasingly ostensibly characterized. Therefore, “in spite of 
itself,” the reified rationalism of the devolved, no longer one-dimensional Liberal system of 
transnational monopoly capitalism creates the opportunity for precisely the Picconean moment of 
subject-object identification. It is this sociological dialectic that opens the path for socially 
individuated emancipatory movements, premised on the reconstitution of organic negativity, and 
the possibility of qualitative change.175 Thus, the particular interests of groups characterized (at 
least partially) by an opposition to the totally administered society can assert themselves 
distinctly without succumbing to the particularity of Liberal identitarianism.  
Fall 1978: The Crisis of One-Dimensionality 
In “The Crisis of One Dimensionality”, Piccone expands upon assertions made in his 
essay from The New German Review, analyzing the nature of the crisis of critical theory and 
addressing the possibilities for revitalizing the moribund. Echoing “The Changing Function of 
Critical Theory,” Piccone again asserts that the retention of Marxist ideology emanating from the 
1930s lies at the heart of the inability of the contemporary left to reckon with the overwhelming 
nature of the one-dimensional society as a transition to one characterized by artificial negativity, 
a retention manifested in a failure to “critically dissect Marxism itself”176 when confronted with 
the administrative, totalizing nature of fascism, Stalinism, and the New Deal, all of which 
represent homogenizing efforts on the parts of technocratic states, albeit characterized by 
tremendously variable degrees of physical repression. In Piccone’s view, where intellectuals 
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ought to have realized this confluence of rationalization, they failed to do so until it was too 
late—when one-dimensionality was fully articulated, it was already “historically obsolete” 
insofar as it described “a process of capitalist development already in the process of being 
superseded” by the artificial negativity attendant to re-rationalization.177  
The psychoanalysis and microscopic social analysis of critical theorists, as well as the 
long duree ontological assertions about the arc of domination in western society on a scale 
reaching back to the classical era—neutered the dialectic, rooting it in what Piccone alternately 
refers to as a “biological” (psychoanalytic) and “objective” (quantitative) context, which 
prevented critical theory from recognizing its tardiness in its identification of the one-
dimensional society and its implications for the future. Comparing critical theory, broadly, to the 
student movements of the 1960s, Piccone asserts that in the same fashion the student movements 
succeeded in merely reproducing “social relations under different labels,” critical theory was 
unable to see beyond the pervasiveness of one-dimensionality, “thus missing the most 
fundamental new developments in advanced capitalism,” the constitution of a system of 
artificially cultivated negativity.178 The failure to recognize one-dimensionality as a mere 
transitional period between the triumph of a new type of domination—the “full domination” of 
capital—and the era from which Marxist orthodoxy emanates, that of entrepreneurial capitalism, 
created a precondition in which Marxist-oriented thinkers were unable to recognize and contend 
with the hegemony of capital and the dissolution of specificity necessary for the process of 
rationalization and re-rationalization (the latter sustained by the proliferation of artificial 
negativity).179  
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To exemplify the failure on the part of the broad left to comprehend the fullness of this 
transition, Piccone cites the jubilant atmosphere surrounding the “defeat” of the United Nations 
forces involved in Vietnam. Where he had previously, in the 1960s, perceived third-world 
resistance to the extension of Western power as a potential source of external negativity, writing 
in 1978, Piccone had reformulated his understanding of the Vietnam war and its “loss” as 
essentially a triumph for the newly-empowered forces of transnational capitalism discussed at 
some length by Luke in the preceding essay. The celebration of a military failure, and the 
attendant perceived failure of imperialist policies, represents the fundamental misunderstanding 
of the new era of capital domination by the left due to its unwillingness to jettison the 
assumptions of orthodox Marxism generated during the era of entrepreneurial capitalism. “All 
that is necessary today to safeguard international domination,” wrote Piccone, “is trade and 
cultural imperialism,”180 echoing Luke’s views that the proxy struggles of the cold-war were 
tremendously advantageous to transnational corporate entities no longer strictly tied to the formal 
imperial pursuits of the rationalized nation-state. Indeed, for Piccone, the Vietnam war had 
morphed from a traditional confrontation between western hegemony (wherein the power of the 
state served the interests of capital) to a “confrontation between a progressive and backward 
sector of capitalism”—transnational cultural domination and formal imperial domination—in 
which the former, progressive manifestation of the furtherance of capital interests prevailed.181 
This reevaluation of the significance of the Vietnamese conflict by Piccone represents a critical 
transition in his view of the nature of and manifestations of capital domination. The outcome of 
the war was, for Piccone and the new transnational entities, irrelevant, insofar as the only 
distinction in outcomes would be the state structure that mediated the administration of 
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unstoppable cultural imperialism dictated by the necessity of economic existence in a world 
dominated by capital. 182 
Indeed, the domination of capital is sustained by distinct mechanisms during the periods 
described by Piccone and Luke. During the entrepreneurial phase, capital expansion and society 
was predicated on the power of free agents in a non-interventionist (domestically) state that 
would engage in imperialism in order to extend capital overseas, thus allowing an influx of 
wealth to the benefit of the metropole and forestalling the success of the then-extant organic 
opposition. Following this came the transitory phase of state-administrative rationalization, 
which has already been described at length (and, crucially, was never properly accounted for in 
leftist theory as a transitional phase to a distinct version of transnational capitalism but was often 
misapprehended as a statist-bureaucratic movement towards implementation of progressive 
policy), which fundamentally had the effect of dissolving particularity and otherness, thereby 
creating a one-dimensional society. The one-dimensional society, however, in the absence of the 
mechanisms by which it had rationalized and homogenized itself (state intervention, suppression 
of dissidents, and so on) required the external safety valve of artificially cultivated negativity 
when it began the inevitable process of counterproductive re-rationalization. Thus, contends 
Piccone, it is at the nadir of economic rationalization that the state-administrative system, having 
sowed the seeds for its own dissolution in relying on the eternality of bureaucratic technocracy 
(which turned inward on itself), began to generate “bureaucratically sanctioned…system driven 
negativity” which, despite its counter-bureaucratic tendencies, fundamentally existed within the 
phenomenological scope of the bureaucratic political system. Thus, the organic negativity that 
constitutes a necessary discursive antecedent to the critical moment of subject-object identicality 
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(and therefore qualitative change) remains outside the reach of progressive reformers operating 
within the parametrized bureaucratic system.  
“One need only examine,” wrote Picccone, “what has recently happened to the black 
movement, women’s organizations, and criminality in general to realize the pervasiveness of this 
change from the transition stage to that of full monopoly capital.”183 Where once rational 
homogenization characterized the transitional phase between monopoly capital on a transnational 
scale and the diffuse otherness of entrepreneurial capitalism, the characteristics of full monopoly 
capital compelled groups in the United States to seek “to artificially reconstruct an otherness 
which had long since been effectively destroyed.”184 These attempts, being inherently inorganic 
due to the fundamental absence of an existing otherness from which to derive their newly 
asserted identity, were coordinated from above by the liberal-bureaucratic system even as its 
transitory rationalization succumbed to the transnational characteristics of monopoly capital. 
Piccone builds upon this assertion by articulating a similar pattern in the development of the 
women’s rights movements and a general rise in criminality during the 1970s—both are results 
of the reopening of a public sphere of negativity in which organic externalities are unable to 
coalesce because of the totalizing effects of the transitory phase. Indeed, Piccone goes so far as 
to characterize the Equal Rights Amendment as “progressive neither from the viewpoint of the 
new requirements of the [artificially negative, transnational] system nor from the depersonalized 
perspective of the private woman who sees in her femininity the last protection against total 
anonymity.”185 Where once homogeneity was enforced via a deft combination of subtle coercion 
and state-administrative regulatory measures, the era of artificial negativity necessitates both the 
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reintroduction of (qualitatively different) spheres of negativity and, in response to their 
qualitative difference, formerly unnecessary repressive measures such as the death penalty, 
resulting from the necessity of repressing the “brutalized and depersonalized individual who 
breaks free of the shackles of internal control mechanisms.”186 
What Piccone articulates is a system of counterintuitive reification and cyclical 
repression of the possibility of external negativity, supplanted by the bureaucratic artificial 
negativity represented by the devolution of state powers to the local level (as discussed by Luke) 
and the reintroduction of external mechanisms such as policing systems and, with the 
Liberalization of the regulatory state, poverty control mechanisms and the welfare state in 
general.  
Significantly, in “The Crisis of One Dimensionality,” Piccone addresses the question of 
the effect of transnational liberalism on what he deems the “new international context,” in which 
the managerial intelligentsia becomes characterized by occidental jingoism and the working class 
is compelled to exist in a sort of international state of misery characterized by decreased 
production and an intensification of escapism. Presciently, in describing the effect this cycle has 
on the Soviet Union during the state of détente, Piccone predicts an inevitable “resurgence of 
traditional religion” and “an intensification of cynical individualism…and the bureaucracy 
toward an unprincipled opportunism whose main goal is merely the retention of existing 
privileges,”187 a prescient prediction of post-Soviet eastern European affairs—indeed, a decade 
prior to the collapse of the USSR, Piccone already characterizes the results of the new 
transnational order (in which even ostensibly communist states rely on the hegemonic 
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transnational market) as one in which the “gradual deterioration of Russia to a sub-imperialist 
power” becomes inevitable.188  
Interestingly, however, Piccone also addresses the Chinese model alongside the Russian 
one, and fails to take into account the possibility that China might simultaneously Liberalize its 
market in line with the new global order while simultaneously retaining the repressive 
instruments of state bureaucracy—characterizing it as intractable Stalinist, he characterizes the 
“inherent tendency of the Chinese model…not only increasingly towards bureaucratic 
collectivism but Stalinism and its irresolvable internal conflicts.”189 Piccone’s dismissal of the 
probability of Chinese reform, situated alongside a level-headed and accurate characterization of 
the Eastern Bloc’s increasing reliance on western economic hegemony, is a striking contrast and 
demonstrative of the degree to which Piccone relies on notions of societal inertia to underscore 
his philosophical arguments.  
It is at this juncture that Piccone articulates the heart of his international argument 
regarding the continued hegemony of the western capitalist model on a global scale, 
characterizing it as essentially unassailable due to the reintroduction of expansive—and intensive, 
as both are not mutually exclusive—process of unequal exchange between the first and third 
worlds, which fuels the consumptive culture of the capitalist west while exporting the ecological 
and social problems attendant to the extraction of natural resources necessary to sustain 
consumption overseas.190 This new variety of unequal exchange, which his driven by a 
fundamentally different type of coercion than the era of gunboat diplomacy, is inherently 
invulnerable to the basic objectivist orientation of Communist economic arguments which 
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concern themselves almost exclusively with “challenging capitalism on economic grounds while 
relegating questions of meaning and value to a cultural dimension degraded to an epiphemonal 
status.”191 Therefore, in Piccone’s view, the only viable avenue for authentic opposition to the 
spread of capital hegemony is not the renewal of existing economic arguments favored by 
communists—particularly when the lived experience of the capitalist first world, in its 
consumptive throes, continues to raise the quality of life for significant proportions of the first 
and third world while simultaneously lacking any significant economic alternative—are cultural 
avenues capable of “demystifying technocratic management, scientistic ideologies, [and] 
hierarchical relations in everyday life.”192  
Again, however, Piccone perceives a hopeful avenue through which this cultural 
opposition to the material hegemony of transnational capitalism might manifest itself. Somewhat 
surprisingly, from a contemporary perspective, he evinces a singular hope in the leftist political 
trajectory of Southern Europe, characterizing the Italian communist party as an authentic mass-
movement characterized by a dual recognition that the socially homogenized social-democratic 
systems of Northern Europe constitute a “historical dead end, and that the Russian model is even 
worse.”193 Similar to his perception that the creation of free spaces in the context of late 
capitalism could, with the application of the historical dialectic to critical theory with the aim of 
constructing a self-conscious qualitatively revolutionary movement in the west, he perceives the 
Italian, Spanish, and to a lesser extent, French political structures as conducive to the emergence 
of a mass-cultural movement under the aegis of communist parties. These parties, existing in a 
context distinct from the German hegemonic social democracy which has maintained itself via 
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the persistent suppression of left opposition, are positioned, he believed, to “successfully attack 
the consumerist model,” thereby undermining the bureaucratized Soviet socialist model and 
providing a viable alternative to the “new Pax Americana” which will “reopen the debate on the 
meaning of socialism, no longer confined to its economic component” but expanded to address 
the cultural characteristics of technocratic domination in everyday life. 194 
Fall 1980: Why Did The Left Collapse? 
By 1980—the generally accepted year of the triumph of the Washington Consensus and 
international neoliberalism—Piccone (like other illiberal “left” philosophers, such as Murray 
Bookchin195) had come to fully accept what he regarded as the utter irrelevancy of Marxism in 
the modern era. In “Why Did The Left Collapse,” Piccone demonstrates the degree to which he 
had revised his estimate of Marxism and its companion ideologies along the anarchist spectrum. 
Where once they had been understood as, essentially, patients nearing death and in need of life-
saving care via the process of dialectical self-understanding, by 1980, even palliative care for the 
ossified Marxist traditions became an impossible pathway towards revolutionary change for 
Piccone. Though he had alluded to these basic notions before—that the very principles of 
Marxist thought must be revised or discarded—it is not until 1980 that Piccone is willing to 
unambiguously assert that the Left has is not merely in need of a course correction, but requires a 
“careful reexamination of the very meaning of the Left” which has “long since ceased to be 
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radical, does not have even the faintest idea of a meaningful alternative to the existing 
order….[and] it has overlooked that its strategy has long since become conformist and 
uncritical”196 in the sense that it has succumbed to Liberal internalization via petty reformism 
and integration into systematic, quantitative, participatory Liberal politics. This tendency 
towards internalization was amplified by the common thread of social homogenization inflicted 
in the transitional phase of capitalism, which fundamentally precludes the evolution of radically-
minded external negativities with qualitatively different models for the function of society, 
which, in Piccone’s view, cannot (or can only with tremendous difficulty) emerge from the 
monopoly culture of late capitalism.  
In “Why Did the Left Collapse,” Piccone analyzes and articulates the fundamental and 
historical factors that had rendered Marxism—and to a significantly lesser extent, anarchism—
irrelevant decades prior to 1980. Indeed, though we see a glimmer of this dissatisfaction in his 
earlier work, even in 1979 Piccone held out some hope for a vision of emancipatory party 
politics in the less hegemonically structured (to his mind) southern European states. A mere one 
year later, Piccone has discarded the possibility of any revivification of either leftist tradition, 
concluding that both were manifestations and reflections of previous historical eras that had been 
transcended during the well-articulated transition from entrepreneurial to monopoly capitalism, 
the latter facilitated by the administrative state. Throughout the course of Piccone’s intellectual 
evolution, the concept of otherness, generally correlating to subjectivity and the capacity of the 
individual to attain the sort of subject-object identification that precedes the acquisition of 
revolutionary consciousness, has been of critical importance. In “Why Did the Left Collapse,” 
Piccone essentially concedes that the traditional is devoid of critical subjectivity: that the 
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“collective subjectivity” of Marxism’s “historical otherness has turned out to be statism, 
bureaucratism, and the gulag,” all attributable to the “swamps of the class analysis.”197 This is a 
distinct break from Marxism in a holistic sense, particularly for someone who, a decade earlier, 
had focused his intellectual efforts on the constitution of a subject capable of attaining broad 
class analysis through the concrete action combination of theory and praxis in 
“Phenomenological Marxism.” 
With regards to anarchism, Piccone is equally dismissive, characterizing it as “simply 
seeking to vindicate the radical features of the bourgeois project,” which “presupposes precisely 
the kind of full-fledged individuality” that has been, in Piccone’s analysis, utterly annihilated by 
the triumph of the monopolistic-administrative society. Indeed, for Piccone (reflecting some of 
his personal contempt for academia and its structures) he contends that, given the degree to 
which anarchism is premised on the necessity of subjective individuality broadly unavailable to 
the body politic, its sole appeal is to a “privileged minority that has already managed to escape 
collective McDonaldization”198—a minority characterized in his previous essays as those 
allowed to operate within the spaces of artificial negativity opened in the stage of monopoly 
capitalism, particularly those within universities. Thus, like all supposed otherness that thrives in 
such artificial spaces, anarchist thought is, in his mind, equally integrated into the system as 
supposedly alternative Marxist conceptions of society—thoroughly appropriated by the 
artificially manageable negative and theoretically unsound in its inability to “articulate socially 
possible and politically legitimate forms of authority” in the context of late-capitalist society that 
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do not inherently require the material dismantling of the system and, thus, tremendous 
destruction and suffering.199 
Re-exhibiting his tendency to articulate concepts in terms of sociohistorical conditions—
which, despite the abstraction of the artificial negativity thesis, remains fundamentally rooted in 
the phenomenological changes of the monopolized lived-experience engendered by the 
infiltration of the administrative state—Piccone views the sum total of traditional left wing 
thought as the remnant of past historical stages. Both emerged as a response to the prevailing 
conditions of pre-monopolistic capitalism, and are discursively rooted in the social capacity to 
produce otherness that existed prior to the transition period of post-New Deal society. They are 
inherently discredited by their irrelevance to the sociohistorical conditions of monopoly 
capitalism— Marxism, for Piccone, reflected the relatively dynamic capacity of the 
entrepreneurial phase of capitalism to generate negativity in the form of autonomously organized 
labor unions characterized by various degrees of radicalism (and thus generalized heterogeneity, 
another characteristic of the entrepreneurial phase of American capitalist development) which 
had been, as previously noted, rendered utterly impotent by the domination of international 
monopoly capital.200 Similarly, Anarchism was a remnant of both the Enlightenment and the era 
of entrepreneurial capitalism—distinct from Marxism, however, insofar as it was concerned with 
the reconstitution of either an “idyllic precapitalist existence” or ameliorating (rather than 
stateless rationalization, as Marxism and its scientific overtones implied during the 
entrepreneurial phase) the dehumanizing and destructive tendencies of capitalism in general.201 
Thus, for Piccone, Marxism and Anarchism were both manifestations of the “social conscience” 
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of transcended stages of historical development and therefore in the age of transnational 
hegemony constitute little more than, quoting Karl Korsch,202 “reactionary utopias”203 inherently 
incapable of confronting the newly manifested tendencies of monocultural advanced capitalism.  
He further asserts, shoring up his justification for the total dismissal of all but the most 
basic (that is to say, desire for a revolutionary alternative to the existing order) elements of 
Marxist and Anarchist thought, that the procedural, administrative, and technical elements of 
American politics in the late-20th century are incompatible with the generation of subjectivity in 
the traditional Leftist sense. “Over the last half century” writes Piccone, “the very character of 
politics has changed by displacing the traditional arena as well as potential constituencies,” 
insofar as the foundation for traditional politics (i.e. government by relative consensus, which 
relies on self-interested and discrete entities furthering their interests via compromise) has 
dissipated in the age of “manipulated consciousness,” which has eliminated the self-interested 
unique constituencies and, thus, the capacity for the political arena to effect qualitative change.204 
Indeed, the Left, failing to recognize its immateriality in an age of constructed consciousness 
administered by a homogenizing cultural industry, inadvertently became a mere quantitative 
reifier, internalizing itself via participation in non-political politics and rendering it one of the 
“shock troops of capitalist rationalization.”205  
It is at this point that Piccone begins to draw out, in more specific terms, some of the 
oblique references he has made to the constitution of the interventionist or welfare state and the 
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effect the left has had on the perpetuation of these institutions. Communist organizers in the 
prewar era who, in tandem with the New Deal and institutions like the National Labor Relations 
Board, corporatized the previously diffuse representatives of the working class are a parallel to 
the civil rights organizers of the 1960s, who, for Piccone, corporatized and integrated 
disenfranchised southern African Americans in a fashion that would have unforeseen, dire 
consequences in terms of a general social capacity to generate organic negativity. Essentially, the 
rationalization of the economy during the transitional phase of the mid-20th century was 
comorbid with the rationalization of social spheres, which retained distinction and therefore 
subjectivity, eliminating, in his mind, the existing otherness of African American southerners. 
The result of this broad rationalization, as previously alluded to in his discussion of the Left’s 
fragmentation into quantitative participants in political rationalization, was the decimation of the 
civil society and the public sphere.206 
Similarly, the Left had failed to confront virtually every other element of the 
monopolized society by operating entirely within the quantitative sphere of capitalist 
rationalization, even if they did so unwittingly. Pursing the “optimal balance between 
investments and consumption which as at the same time socially legitimate and economically 
feasible” the Left created a bulwark against the crises inherent to capitalist boom-bust cycles, 
thus inherently conceding that the capitalist framework could exist perpetually in the limbo of 
tepid reformism substantiated by a depoliticized society. Materially, too, Piccone begins to 
integrate ecological arguments (which had been present to a lesser degree in earlier works) vis-à-
vis the finite limit on our collective capacity to extract and consume resources, arguing that the 
left had utterly “failed to confront the ecological long-run viability of a system of cybernated 
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waste”207 (a concept very similar to those advanced by Telos published eco-anarchist Murray 
Bookchin) and a failure to understand the conflict in Vietnam as a crisis of “overadministration” 
and a general shortcoming of the depoliticized administrative state to contend with foreign crises, 
instead understanding it in an outmoded entrepreneurial framework that placed foreign 
intervention squarely in the opaque and irrelevant box of formal imperialism.  
Piccone’s justifications for the condemnation of the welfare state of the New Deal and the 
attempts made at extending it by Great Society initiatives, the extension of formal civil rights to 
oppressed populations, and his criticisms of traditional left-wing sacred cows such as the most 
basic state-sanctioned redistribution must be taken within the context of the broad intellectual 
framework he (along with Tim Luke) had articulated in the era of artificial negativity. Taken out 
of that context, they bear a striking resemblance to arguments offered by the neoliberal right in 
their advocacy for trickle-down economics as a new manifestation of economic rationalization, 
complete with the tinge of nigh-undeniable racism upon which the Southern Strategy relied.  It 
must therefore be noted that, at this juncture, Piccone has effectively transcended the traditional 
left-right divide in favor of a revolutionarily distinct worldview that neither tolerates nor 
sanctions the quantitative reformism of transcended intellectual frameworks. Some of what he 
writes in “Why Did The Left Collapse,” taken out of this complicated framework, are easily 
interpreted as conservative—or even reactionary—manifestations of racial animus never directly 
articulated by Piccone himself.  
This is most clearly displayed in his discussion of affirmative action and the 
“administrative enfranchisement”208 of minorities—in this case, black southerners and women 
via the feminist movement. As with other previously integrated communities, the penetration of 
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the state apparatus via administration of welfare to materially impoverished black communities 
precipitated the “disintegration of organic social bonds” and, in what could easily be interpreted 
as a striking denial of the agency of impoverished African Americans (but is consistent with 
Piccone’s framework of depersonalization), the condemnation “of the black community to the 
permanent status of de-facto second rate citizenry” owing to a “deadly dependence on the 
welfare state.”209  The most significant effect of this intervention, beyond the vague notion of 
generational dependency, was the opening of a gulf between “elite” and middle-class African 
Americans from the African Americans with whom they had previously culturally and materially 
intertwined due to the unanimity of disenfranchisement. The combination of the flight of the 
black elite from the black community itself and the reliance upon government intervention had 
the effect of—like with Unions and other sources of external negativity—cementing “the 
management rather than the emancipation of ghetto blacks.”210  It is notable that Piccone does 
not extend this particular argument to similar groups dependent upon federal intervention and 
effectively depoliticized or integrated as a result, such as Appalachian whites or other perennially 
impoverished racial-majority groups, though in his framework such groups had ceased to exist 
prior to the 1960s.  
The other principal movement of the 1960s, the feminist movement, is regarded by 
Piccone as having been even more holistically compromised than the state of African American 
emancipation. More than having merely been coopted by the state and reduced, broadly, to an 
instrument of rationalization and homogenization, the women’s movement not only succumbed 
to the administrative state but was simultaneously commodified in a manner distinct from the 
“dependency” (which, in concrete political terms, cemented the African American voting block 
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as dependably in favor of reification of the welfare state211) inflicted upon African Americans. 
Piccone articulates what can only be described as disappointment in the failed potential of the 
women’s movement, in that it was complicit from its very conception in its own 
commodification and, worse, facilitation of the penetration of state homogenization into spheres 
which had hitherto resisted the relentlessly totalizing administration of monopoly capitalism. 
Instead, the women’s movement of the 1960s engendered a tremendous attack on one of the few 
remaining social institutions emanating from a pre-capitalist stage: the family.  
By principally emphasizing the capacity of women as autonomous individuals—or 
economic units—and their correlate ability to engage in the market at levels previously denied to 
them by systematic sexism, the feminist movement “immediately rendered problematic any 
relation not based on the exchange principle” and supplanted the organicism of filial piety by 
“indict[ing] any lingering family function presupposing an organic division of labor,” 
contributing to the commodification of previously existing gender roles. For Piccone, this meant 
the industrialization of the last vestiges of labor that had previously resisted integration into the 
managed system of monopoly capitalism. Essentially, via the feminist pursuit of the revision or 
deconstruction of gender roles, “the women’s liberation movement successfully homogenized 
female consciousness” in a manner conducive to the general elimination of organic negativity 
originating in social spheres which had not been fully rationalized into the prevailing system.212 
Though he acknowledges the legitimate radicalism of certain elements of the movement—what 
he describes as an attempt to revitalize femininity as an analogue to socialism, contrasting the 
inherent masculinity of competitive capitalism—these elements were ultimately subject to 
homogenization owing to, like anarchist visions, their inability to translate theory into socially 
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legitimate and materially possible arrangements of power. The dual processes of family 
deconstruction and political integration precipitated by the mistakes of the women’s movement 
led Piccone to characterize contemporaneous feminism as having “degenerated into a convenient 
and fashionable stance for upwardly mobile career women,”213 thus reifying and perpetuating the 
integrality of individual growth parameterized by capitalist discourse. It became, essentially, a 
bourgeois affectation that served as little more than a social veneer to legitimize the 
reconstruction of the organic family as an economic unit.  
Both of these examples demonstrate the increasingly anti-liberal bent of Piccone’s 
philosophy entering the Reagan era. Where once the particularity of discrete social groups and 
their interests had, in previous historical stages, represented a possible source for the regulatory 
negativity necessity for the sane administration of a heterogeneous society, the cooptation of 
particularity in the context of monopoly capitalism now meant the eternal reproduction of 
capitalist values. Thus, for Piccone, the only possibilities for emancipatory collective action—
and the only avenues in which the left had enjoyed any success, however minor—existed in the 
broadest possible context, what he regards as attempts to defend the “common good.”214 While 
he qualifies his assertion that the Left has enjoyed some success here with his typical affirmation 
that the defense of collective (in the broadest sense) material interests is merely quantitative and 
regulatory rather than evincing the qualitative consciousness, the necessity of which looms large 
in every piece he writes, he concedes that it has managed to “help eliminate the most obviously 
problematic features”215 of monopoly capitalism.  
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The particular example in which he perceives a certain level of progress dovetails with 
his emerging understanding of the ecological destruction inherent to capitalist production both 
domestically and abroad—state utilities, by merit of being high regulated monopolies subject to 
public administration (rather than private capital), are able to perform genuinely political acts in 
a depoliticized age. Political, in the sense Piccone uses it here, refers to “the question of 
collective quality of life against narrow short-run efficiency criteria,” thereby reconstituting 
(albeit on a limited scale) the otherwise eliminated public sphere he discussed earlier in this 
essay.216 “Only in this last instance,” in reference to the emergence of energy alternatives to 
fossil fuels, “do emancipatory interests seem to emerge alongside purely corporative ones.”217 
Though this is small consolation insofar as these negativities perform a solely regulatory 
function and, because of their relationship with Liberal administrative procedures, are 
fundamentally artificial rather than organic (and thus serve to reify the status quo), they do offer 
an example of the sort of concrete action with the effect of improving lived experiences he had 
outlined a decade earlier in “Phenomenological Marxism.”  
That is the only instance in which Piccone has any hope for the domestic “left”—as a 
collective entity capable of ameliorating the most physically destructive elements of hegemonic 
capitalism. Indeed, beyond the niche example of energy policy, Piccone rearticulates Korsch’s 
notion of “reactionary utopianism” as characterizing the modern left, with an emphasis on the 
reactionary element—“the Left, as the social conscience of the welfare state, finds itself 
checkmated” by its position between anti-bureaucratic egalitarianism at its base and the 
inherently bureaucratic nature of New Deal leftism, leaving it impotent to address the 
fundamental issues of capitalist existence. This compels the left to “side on the same corner with 
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the most reactionary forces of protectionist capitalist interests” in its resistance to the inevitable 
neoliberalization of transnational corporate logic and, domestically, to unthinkingly support 
social reifiers such as the civil rights movement which “merely defuse resentment by dealing 
with symptoms without penetrating into real causes.”218 In another manifestation of what, out of 
the context of Piccone’s framework, would be initially regarded as a profoundly conservative 
perspective, he also refers to the advocacy for reproductive equality and sexual liberation in 
general in somewhat moralizing terms, claiming that the Left’s position on issues such as 
abortion cause it to appear as “an advocate of irresponsibility and immorality, and thus as one of 
the prime causes of the general social deterioration.”219 It is difficult to discern whether Piccone 
is merely referring to the optics—or what he might deem social legitimacy—of these movements 
and the degree to which their appearance facilitates corporatization or whether he genuinely 
perceives reproductive rights as part of the penetration of administrative tendencies into even the 
most personal organic spheres.  
It seems clear, however, that what Piccone is doing is engaging directly with the 
arguments of the right and, rather than dismissing them out of hand as bourgeois or self-
interested in the fashion of an orthodox Leftist, he understands them as socially legitimate, or at 
least socially appealing in the context of a homogenized (socially and morally) society and 
therefore counterproductive to the pursuit of qualitative change. In his conclusion, Piccone 
outlines what he perceives as the only possibility for the revitalization of truly organic 
negativity—an existentialist critique of “the enlightenment and bourgeois civilization” with a 
singular focus on the maintenance of precapitalist subjectivity, which continues to exist almost 
exclusively in manifestations dismissed or inimical to the traditional left—“subjectivist quasi-
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religious precategorical dimension[s] which has not yet and can never fully capitulate to the logic 
of the institution…,” a reference to the persistent organicism of “reactionary” spheres such as 
domestic and religious life.  
Thus, for Piccone, any hope for qualitative change must emerge from these precapitalist 
spheres capable of producing negativity that have been rejected by the institutional left and 
generally, but not utterly, appropriated by the institutional right. In order to effect this change, 
the “left must reappropriate and radicalize the right’s critique and most successful organizational 
forms”220 rather than continuing to perpetuate theoretical models premised on transcended 
phases of capitalist development. The left, therefore, must take a historical view of the possibility 
of long-term change effected by the appropriation of these strategies rather than hoping for the 
impossible—spontaneous revolutionary consciousness to be universally attained. Instead, the left 
must instrumentalize its own instrumentalization, but attempt to effect change by “consciously 
participating in the most advanced forms of capitalist rationalization” and, in doing so, sow the 
seeds for the “reconstitution of civil society” during the next phase of capitalist reification and 
rationalization. “The successful reconstitution of civil society” concludes Piccone, “will then 
become the precondition for the reconstitution of individuality and the resurgence of 
emancipatory possibilities.”221  
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Conclusion 
 
While political philosophy may not be inherently prescriptive, it is possible to, 
theoretically, construct lucid, descriptivist works of political science that do not explicitly posit 
alternative structures. However, the act of engaging critically with social structures typically 
compels the reader to attempt to answer these criticisms via the articulation of some alternative 
system, particularly if the author does not. Thus political philosophy finds itself in the unenviable 
position of having to propose an ostensibly workable solution to issues so complex that merely 
identifying problematic elements in social structures is in itself a significant undertaking. 
Furthermore, political philosophy and critical theory are steeped in what is best described as a 
totalizing discourse that must engage with social structures, the hard sciences, geopolitics, “pure” 
philosophy, cultural production, industrial capacity, etc. Therefore the astute political scientist 
often finds themselves in a position where they are forced to incorporate into their arguments or 
analyses disparate sources, concepts, and methodologies in order to systematize the chaotic and 
effervescent constellation of human behaviors and hierarchies into an understandable framework.  
Therefore, attempting to analyze and understand the intellectual trajectory of political 
philosophy in the context of the late twentieth century means, fundamentally, acknowledging the 
complexity of the political philosopher and the degree to which their work is the manifestation of 
a very particular type of expertise. Political science is a product of discursive subtleties 
accumulated, certainly in the case of Paul Piccone, over the course of decades of rigorous 
academic work characterized by a nuanced engagement with the many layers of complexity 
underpinning the major schools of political thought and the confluences between them. Piccone’s 
unique socio-historical approach combined with his persistent capacity to engage with academic 
concepts while remaining outside the parameters of university institutions positions him as a 
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particularly salient example of all of these tendencies in political philosophy. These tendencies 
are particularly evident in charting the trajectory of his political position over the course of Telos’ 
publication, as Piccone moved from a relatively run-of-the-mill late-20th century Marxist to 
something entirely outside of the contemporary left-right dichotomy.  
Piccone’s principal concern was with the progressive internalization of all externalities—
what amounted to all individuality and, in an existential sense, the very authenticity of social 
production itself—being subsumed by the relentlessly administrative, qualitative Liberal state. 
He feared the universality of tepid reformism would be instrumentalized by an emerging, 
transnational class of elites whose power would be maintained by a massive bureaucratic entity 
to which the citizens of the world had become accustomed, facilitating the terminal 
commodification of what few elements of human life had remained outside of the administered 
system. Piccone’s fears emanated from an inherent sympathy for the great mass of human 
experience and, despite his cynicism vis-à-vis the actual revolutionary potential of the body 
politic, he nonetheless devoted his intellectual activity to identifying the possible conditions in 
which emancipation could be achieved. While Piccone may have found solutions to this in, 
initially, revisionist Marxism (the inherent tendencies of which I believe he never fully left 
behind), he was singularly unbound by the dogmatic parameters of traditional political 
arrangements. 
In traditional Marxist philosophy, there are two critical components to the construction of 
revolutionary alternatives to existing arrangements—theory and praxis. One informs the other in 
a reciprocal arrangement that, in theory, ought to advance the social dialectic through a continual 
process in which a broad social consciousness is attained, issues identified via theoretical 
constructs are practically addressed, and the dialectic advances and is thus presented with an 
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opportunity to reach another stage of self-consciousness, perpetually improving society. While 
this is a simplification—the dialectic need not advance “forward,” nor is social consciousness the 
only inherent precursor to manifestations of praxis (since material conditions are a critical 
element of Marxist theory—it offers a basic characterization of the Marxist understanding of 
history).  
Piccone’s principal pursuit was, above all else, the identification and facilitation of this 
moment of broad-self consciousness that would permit the real-world manifestation of 
revolutionary praxis. He felt the relentless advancement of the totalizing state had already begun 
to stifle society’s capacity to produce externalities capable of identifying these issues, replacing 
intellectual elites with technicians and parameterizing the nature of human consciousness so as to 
eventually preclude the concoction of revolutionary theory. As he worked throughout the course 
of the 1970s, after the ostensible triumph of the civil rights movement, the failure of the student 
protests, and the increasingly evident triumph of the neoliberal consensus at home and abroad, 
Piccone’s predictions became increasingly prescient. 
It was the construction of the thesis of artificial negativity that marked Telos’ 
interpretation of late-stage monopoly capitalism. The idea that carefully managed systematic 
opposition to existing sociopolitical arrangements constituted the safest release valve for the 
maintenance of the status quo was not necessarily an original notion in its broadest strokes, but 
the specific characteristics of the administrative state and the avenues—particularly the 
University—associated with the promulgation of this negativity was uniquely Telos. Our 
collective inability to escape from a totalizing system and create a qualitative—not reformist nor 
merely statistical, but a holistic change to the material arrangements and hierarchies by which 
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society is constructed—change would, without intervention, perpetuate this carefully deployed 
arrangement into the distant future. 
In 2018, Piccone’s predictions seem as substantial as ever. Political theater, carefully 
managed by for-profit entities, increasingly characterizes our public discourse. Cybernation and 
atomization, with the attendant devotion to social particularities and a corollary lack of interest in 
qualitative change, are encouraged by the prevailing Liberal ethos in politics. Student 
movements retain their class character and remain as ineffective and dogmatic as they did when 
Piccone wrote in 1969. Conflict abroad and the squelching of alternative systems, though less 
explicit than during the proxy interventions of the cold war, remains the major catalyst in 
Western foreign policy. In this sense, the works of Paul Piccone and his analyses remain as 
relevant today as when they were written, particularly as the symptoms of ubiquitously 
administered transnational capitalism are exacerbated by the twin processes of unprecedented 
domestic capital accumulation and the reassertion of geopolitical rivalries in the post cold-war 
context.  
Piccone hoped to identify the sociological precursors to a moment of revolutionary self-
identification among those who do not compose the new administrative class, a group 
considerably broader than the traditional proletariat of unreformed Marxism. Piccone saw the 
possibility of revolutionary movements emerging from the cybernated alienation and 
homogenization of late capitalism, characterized by the spasmodic throes of dying human 
authenticity—and while his theory was largely concerned with understanding the possibility of 
an egalitarian, qualitative revolution, it is also a medium through which we can attempt to 
understand the changes of the 21st century. The Arab Spring and its ultimately failed assertion of 
the primacy of political and socioeconomic Liberalism and the relitigation of immemorial 
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irredentist disputes precipitating (among other things) the Russian-led invasion of the Crimea 
and eastern Ukraine are both indicative of the historical currents identified by Piccone and the 
Telos cohort.  
Simultaneously, opposition movements at home that had previously been deprived of 
mainstream legitimacy and thus expunged from the acceptable discursive parameters dictated by 
the administrative-Liberal state have reasserted their capacity to attract domestic adherents. 
Authoritarian ethnonationalism has been rendered politically legitimate—albeit in an atomized, 
diffuse fashion—and crept into public view in an unprecedented manner, as illustrated most 
effectively by the Charlottesville “United the Right” rally of August 2017, which created an 
international furor due to its open inclusion of neo-Nazi and Ku Klux Klan associated groups and 
catalyzed a popular fascination with their motivations. Reactions to administrative totality have 
also manifested themselves via the popularization of deregulatory movements on the right of the 
Libertarian spectrum, while the traditional Left has slowly began to deemphasize its Liberalism 
in favor of orthodox economic agitation, most obviously via the rise of the Democratic Socialists 
of America. Understanding the sociopolitical catalysts for these oppositional movements will be 
a critical task for historians, philosophers, and agitants alike—and the writings of Telos have a 
tremendous, and largely unexplored, contribution to make.  
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